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CHAPTER I. INTRODUCTION 
Problem Statement 
The environment in which cooperatives operate has 
changed a great deal since 1844 when the Rochdale pioneers 
established the first permanent cooperative on Toad Lane and 
laid down a set of operating principles. Robert Owen, 
Charles Fourier and others based their ideas of cooperative 
philosophy on the premise that all members are homogeneous 
and should be treated equally. Even though the founding 
Rochdale pioneers included individuals of different 
economic, social, and political classes, no member was 
intentionally treated any better or worse than anyone else. 
Today's interpretation of the cooperative ideology also 
presumes that all members are equal and should be treated 
similarly. All members have historically been treated 
similarly because no single member was distinquished from 
the others. If a difference among members existed, the 
dissimilarity did not have any influence on how the members 
were treated. The cooperative principle of operating at 
cost by paying patronage refunds exhibits the pioneers' 
intent that patrons should be accountable to the cooperative 
for the cost associated with the provision of a product or 
service. The cooperative business operates at cost by 
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returning any surplus to the members in the form of a 
patronage refund. Although cooperative philosophy was based 
on the idea of a homogeneous membership, the diversity of 
modern American agriculture has brought about a trend 
towards non-homogeneity of agricultural producers. The 
decline in farm numbers coupled with the increasingly 
bimodal distribution of farm size causes potential operating 
problems for cooperatives which treat all patrons exactly 
alike. For example, should larger producers with larger 
patronage volumes be treated any differently than smaller 
producers with correspondingly smaller patronage volumes? 
Strict adherence to the wording of the Rochdale Principle 
"equal treatment of members" would say no, however the 
actual intent may yield a different answer. There may be a 
problem of semantics here. If the original intent of the 
pioneers was to have individual members pay the costs of 
being provided the service, different member types could be 
expected to pay different prices. Of course, if a 
cooperative's cost of supplying a service is independent of 
the volume of an individual's patronage, all patrons will 
still pay the same amount. The problem of patrons not 
paying cost-justified prices could arise if the 
cooperative's costs are dependent on an individual's 
patronage level. Historically, patrons have paid the same 
price without any consideration given to the individual's 
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volume of patronage. There is an increasing trend for large 
volume patrons to demand a more favorable price than the 
average patron because other businesses will try to attract 
these patrons by offering them a better price. Using a 
simplistic cooperative scenario looking only at the pricing 
policies of the decision-maker (omitting any financing 
concerns) the issue becomes more apparent. Table 1.1 
illustrates the situation where a cooperative supplies a 
service to patrons with varying amounts of patronage but 
charges only one price for the service. For simplicity, 
assume that this price includes any value of future 
patronage refunds. 
Table 1.1. Example of a cooperative using a single price 
Average Producer 
Patron % of Cost of Competitor Cooperative Benefit of 
Group Business Provision Price Price Patronage 
A 70 $5.00 $5.20 $5.40 $ ( . 2 0 )  
B 20 6.00 6.24 5.40 .84 




1. The cooperative knows the exact average total cost of 
providing the service to each group. 
2. The cooperative members can purchase the same service 
from a non-cooperative competitor which has a pricing 
policy of cost plus 4%. 
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3. The cooperative's average cost of supplying the service 
to patrons is negatively related to the volume of 
patronage of the patron. 
This example shows the paradoxical situation of a 
cooperative with a heterogeneous membership. Patrons in 
group A who account for 70% of the total cooperative 
business volume pay the same amount for the service ($5.40) 
as patrons in groups B and C, even though the cooperative 
incurs a lower average cost in providing the service to 
group A patrons ($5.00). Looking solely at the monetary 
benefits from the cooperative, patrons in group A would have 
negative benefits since the service could be obtained 
through alternative sources for 20 cents less. Is it 
equitable that these large volume patrons subsidize the cost 
of supplying lower volume patrons? In the case of a supply 
cooperative, if business operations are to be done at cost, 
an argument (as shown in Table 1.2) can be made that each 
member group should pay for the cost of obtaining the 
services that they demand. Table 1.2 illustrates the 
implications for a supply cooperative which takes into 
consideration the actual cost of supplying the service to 
specific member groups in determining the prices charged to 
those groups. 
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Table 1.2. Example of a cooperative using multiple prices 
Average Producer 
Patron % of Cost of Competitor Cooperative Benefit of 
Group Business Provision Price Price Patronage 
A 70 $5.00 $5.20 $5.00 $.20 
B 20 6.00 6.24 6.00 .24 
C 10 7.00 7.28 7.00 .28 
The assumptions for Table 1.2 are the same as those for 
Table 1.1 except that instead of one average price being 
charged for the service, each member group pays only the 
cost the cooperative incurs in providing the service to 
them. Using this type of pricing strategy, each member pays 
a price that is better than the price from alternative 
sources and still covers all costs associated wittt its 
provision. 
By differentially treating members the cooperative may 
be able to retain the members of group A. Without the 
members in group A the weighted average cost of provision 
increases from $5.40 to $6.33. If the cooperative can keep 
the business of group A, the members in the other groups 
would benefit. It would be to the advantage of these other 
groups to allow the cooperative decision-maker to 
differentially treat those in group A if it was the only way 
to maintain their patronage. The additional business volume 
created by group A may enable to cooperative to gain 
economies of scale which could be passed back in varying 
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proportions to all groups. This illustrates why 
differential treatment could be beneficial to all groups of 
members. 
The objective of this paper is to look at the effects 
on the cooperative when each member group can be treated in 
a different manner from the others. This research will look 
into the effects on cooperative membership, finance, and 
profit. It would be interesting to look at the fairness or 
equitability of differential member treatment, however 
defining what is equitable is difficult and goes beyond the 
scope and intent of this research. We will not say whether 
one situation is more "equitable" than another. No 
subjective judgements will be made. Only comparisons of the 
quantifiable effects of different cases will be attempted, 
leaving the interpretation of "fairness" to others. 
Problem Formulation 
Previous models (Royer 1978, VanSickle 1980, Fischer 
1984) have analyzed the operational procedures of 
cooperatives. These theoretical models provided cooperative 
management with information that could help them in striving 
for optimal operating and financing strategies. Royer [52] 
devised an optimizing model for determining pricing and 
production policies. The work done by VanSickle [64] was 
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designed to examine the cooperative decision nexus of the 
relationship between the production and pricing decision and 
the financing decision. Fischer [18] assesses cooperative 
financial concerns by forming a model that contains both the 
pricing and production problem and the financial problem. 
None of these models allowed individual members or member 
groups to be treated differentially since it was assumed the 
cooperative membership was homogeneous. Prior research 
identifies only a "typical member" of a cooperative. The 
model presented in Chapter III maintains that a more 
pertinent view would be to look at a typical member of a 
categorical group within the cooperative. How these groups 
are devised can be based on many different criteria. For 
reasons mentioned later, this work considers member groups 
to be defined on the basis of varying levels of cooperative 
patronage. By looking at specific types of groups within 
the cooperative, the implications for optimal operating 
strategies for a cooperative can be determined. The model 
proposed in Chapter III will enable the cooperative 
decision-maker to look at the problems of pricing, 
production, and financing from this vantage point. The 
decision-maker can now determine how treating distinct 
groups of members dissimilarly will affect the cooperative 
pricing, production, and financial strategies. 
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Review of the Literature 
There has been no previous research looking 
specifically at the differential treatment of cooperative 
members. In reviewing the literature of cooperative 
associations, there has been no discussion of heterogeneous 
members. From the earliest research of Nicholls [46] and 
Emelianoff [15] to recent models of Royer [52] and Fischer 
[18], none have mechanisms to study a specific member. Past 
research has looked at the cooperative and/or a typical 
member. A brief discussion of the previous research on 
cooperative theory will be presented. 
There are two distinct approaches found in the 
literature. One considers the cooperative as an optimizing, 
decision-making unit while the other does not. Most 
theoretical models after Helmberger and Hoos's [27] 1962 
article regard a cooperative as an enterprise which can make 
decisions as a distinct unit. The majority of the earlier 
literature saw the cooperative only as an extension of a 
group of individual members and, as Phillips [48, p. 249] 
put it, cooperatives do not have a "separate economic 
identity;...". This latter school of thought does not 
recognize a cooperative as a business enterprise separate 
from that of the members. Since there is little question 
now that the cooperative is an economic entity, only brief 
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attention will be given to the literature that does not view 
the cooperative as a decision-making unit. The emphasis of 
this literature review will be on the decision-maker 
cooperative models, with an indepth analysis of the Royer 
[52], VanSickle [64], and Fischer [18] work. 
Emelianoff, one of the earlier cooperative theorists, 
was provoked by the question [15, p. 246] "what have we got 
to do to be entitled to be considered a cooperative?". In 
answering this question he concluded that a cooperative was 
an organization of independent economic units (patrons) 
which is coordinated, owned and controlled by these same 
economic entities. Another conclusion that Emelianoff [15] 
reached was that to remain a stable and viable cooperative, 
the membership must be homogeneous. He called this the 
"unwritten law" of cooperation. The belief was that a 
heterogeneous membership could cause social unrest in the 
cooperative. Many others followed Emelianoff's school of 
thought including, most notably, Robotka [50], Phillips 
[48], Aresvik [4], and Trifon [58]. All these authors echo 
the sentiment that a cooperative is an economically lifeless 
unit. Robotka asserts that members of the cooperative, 
while independent from each other, mutually operate the 
cooperative for the joint benefit of all members. The 
cooperative has an economic purpose only in the sense that 
producers can band together and benefit from its existence; 
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it has no economic life of its own. Phillips [48, pp. 
74-75] affirms Robotka's convictions when he stated a 
"cooperative has no more economic life or purpose apart from 
that of the participating economic units than one of the 
individual plants of a large multi-plant firm...". An 
integral concept of Phillips work was that of 
proportionality. That is, all participating firms of the 
joint multi-plant will share on a proportional basis the 
economic endeavors of the cooperative. The economic use of 
the cooperative, all the costs, financial responsibility, 
and economic benefits, if any, would be shared among members 
on a proportional basis according to patronage. A 
cooperative was viewed as a vertically integrated '  
multi-plant firm with individual members representing 
separate plants which supply inputs to the multi-plant firm. 
Each individual member (plant) allocates its resources 
between its own production process and the jointly owned 
multi-plant. Phillips maintained that a cooperative was a 
multi-plant firm and that corresponding economic theory 
could be used to derive the optimal allocation of firm 
resources. For the individual firms (members) to maximize 
profits they must meet the following conditions; (a) 
marginal productivity of each resource used by the member 
and cooperative must be equal, and (b) individual members 
will equate the sum of their marginal costs to both the 
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marginal cost and marginal revenue of the cooperative. The 
individual members will attain these optimality conditions 
by varying their own patronage volumes. 
Both Aresvik [4] and Ohm [47] expressed skepticism 
concerning Phillip's second optimality condition. They 
maintained that in practice producers will use the concept 
of average cost or average revenue rather than marginal cost 
or marginal revenue. Trifon also expounded on the criticism 
of Aresvik and Ohm by saying that this second condition was 
even incompatible with Phillip's concept of proportionality. 
It was pointed out that by using Phillip's intrepretation of 
proportionality, members should expect to pay average cost 
and receive average revenue, not the respective marginal 
concepts. Since members customarily do not know the 
marginal cost or marginal revenue associated with the 
cooperative, they use the associated average concepts. 
Another criticism of Phillip's work was the analogy of the 
cooperative as a multi-plant firm. Trifon argued that a 
cooperative can not be considered a vertically integrated 
multi-plant firm since the former serves a single economic 
interest whereas the latter serves many simultaneously. 
Enke [16] proposed a model for consumer cooperatives 
where a decision-maker allocates resources such that the sum 
of members' consumer surplus and profits are maximized. A 
crucial assumption of Enke's model is that members determine 
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their level of patronage solely on the initial price charged 
with no consideration given to eventual refunds. This 
simplifies the cooperative decision-maker's selection of 
output level since quantity is now only a function of the 
initial price charged. Following this assumption the 
decision-maker should set the price charged equal to the 
associated marginal cost. Future researchers questioned why 
patronage refunds would not be involved with the members 
determination of patronage level and developed models which 
incorporated this idea. When members do anticipate some 
refund it generally disrupts Enke's condition that price 
should be set equal to the marginal cost [18, p. 44]. 
Assuming member patronage is a function of net price, the 
cooperative decision-maker should set the price charged 
equal to the average cost, not marginal cost. 
Clark [10] presented another model in which the 
cooperative acted as a decision-maker. The cooperative had 
an objective function that minimized the cost of providing 
goods to members. The cooperative decision-maker minimizes 
the cost of providing goods by operating at the point where 
the average cost equals the marginal cost of providing the 
good (point of minimum average cost). Since Clark assumed 
that all members had a fixed level of "physical patronage", 
the decision-maker can achieve the optimal level of 
operations by regulating the level of cooperative 
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membership. Clark maintained that the cooperative principle 
of service at cost was very important and should be 
preserved even if it meant denying new memberships or 
terminating current ones. Aizsilnieks [2] and Gislason [22] 
both criticized Clark's model specification and assumptions. 
The model was inappropriate in the sense that cooperatives 
can not realistically manipulate their membership size and 
if they could, the level determined by the cooperative may 
not be the level desired by members. 
Because of dissatisfaction with existing objective 
functions, Helmberger and Hoos [27] proposed a new one with 
a different approach in analyzing the cooperative 
enterprise. A theoretical model of a single product 
marketing cooperative that maximizes the price paid to 
members was developed. By using marginal analysis, two 
optimality conditions were derived: (a) whatever production 
level the cooperative chooses it must be done at minimum 
cost, and (b) the cooperative's surplus must be maximized. 
Helmberger [26] proceeded to use this model to study the 
effect cooperatives had on the performance of agricultural 
product markets. 
Hardie [25a] extended the Helmberger and Hoos model 
into a multi-product marketing cooperative using linear 
programming. A separable programming "pooling constraint" 
was employed to overcome several restrictions that occurred 
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in simple linear programming models. Using this model, the 
cooperative decision-maker could use the shadow prices as 
the basis for determining the allocation of cooperative 
"profits" among different products. A major emphasis of 
Hardie's work was that both the cooperative and the 
individual member are decision-makers who attempt to 
optimize their respective objective functions. Members were 
assumed to maximize their surplus income over costs while 
the cooperative decision-maker maximized the aggregate rent 
accruing to fixed resources of members and the cooperative. 
By maximizing the rents accruing to fixed factors, the 
cooperative decision-maker is essentially maximizing the 
aggregate surplus of all member firms. 
Ladd [32] also extended the analysis of the Helmberger 
and Hoos model to a multi-product cooperative. In Ladd's 
model a bargaining cooperative was assumed to perform three 
services, (a) selling a production input to both members and 
non-members, (b) providing an excludable public good to 
members only, and (c) bargaining with processors for higher 
raw product prices for its members. Two different objective 
functions were suggested: maximization of the price received 
by the members for their raw materials and maximization of 
the quantity of raw material marketed through the 
cooperative. First order conditions for the different 
objective functions were derived using the price charged by 
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the cooperative for production inputs and the level of 
excludable public goods provided as choice variables. It 
was shown that these two sets of first order conditions 
differed from each other and from those of a profit 
maximizing proprietary firm. 
Royer's work [52] in modelling cooperative associations 
incorporated many of the ideas presented by earlier 
researchers but filled in several gaps that caused 
difficulty in the earlier models. A nonlinear programming 
model of a multi-product cooperative was presented that 
allowed the cooperative to do non-member business on a 
profit basis, permitted members to patronize other firms, 
and acknowledged that expected patronage refunds entered the 
individual member's decision-making process. By assuming 
that individual producers maximized expected profits, profit 
functions for a typical member and non-member were written: 
IT =  Z P.q. - Z P,-q,- -  fc + ds + pvpr (1.1) 
i£X ^ ^ icY 1 1 
where p^ = the price of the i-th product 
= the quantity of the i-th product 
X = a set of outputs produced by members and 
non-member patrons 
Y = a set of variable inputs purchased by member 
and non-member patrons 
fc = the fixed costs of a typical patron 
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ds = the dividends on stock held by the typical 
member patron 
pvpr = the present value of allocated patronage 
refunds of a typical member 
r . 
1 
= [s+(l-s)/(l+d)^] Z r. q 
ieC ^ 1 
( 1 . 2 )  
where s = a constant proportion of patronage refunds 
paid in cash 




= a typical producer s discount rate 
= a set of products sold to or variable inputs 
purchased from the cooperative 
= the cooperative member's expected per unit 
patronage refund 
By means of adding production and fixed factor usage 
constraints, a Lagrangian function was formed that yielded 
Kuhn-Tucker conditions for individual producers. Solving 
these Kuhn-Tucker conditions yield output supply and input 
demand functions for typical member and non-member patrons. 
These supply and demand functions were represented as: 
^i "  ^ i^^x' ^y' ^c ' 
where 
ie X,Y (1.3) 
= a price vector for products in set X 
P = a price vector for products in set Y 
* 
R = a vector of expected per-unit patronage 
^ refunds 
Qg = a vector of public goods provided by the 
cooperative 
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The cooperative Lagrangian function is analagous to the 
individual's except that there are several additional 
constraints to consider. The cooperative's profit function 
is the sum of the individual member's profit functions and 
is written as: 
TT =  Z P.q.r - Z p.q-r - FCM + DS + PVPR (1.4) 
ieX ^ ieY ^ ic 
where q. = the quantity of the i-th product purchased 
or sold by the member patrons 
FCM = the cooperative's fixed cost 
DS = the total dividends on stock 
PVPR = the present value of all allocated 
patronage refunds 
Three constraints, production, fixed factor, and the 
allowable amount of non-member patronage, were placed on the 
cooperative profit function. The Kuhn-Tucker conditions for 
the typical cooperative decision-maker are of questionable 
use because as Royer [52] noted, not only are the optimality 
conditions complex, but there is a great amount of 
information which is necessary to evaluate them. Royer's 
framework was applied to single product marketing and single 
product supply cooperatives in order to compare the 
optimality conditions with those of previous models. By 
making different sets of assumptions, Royer's model gave 
results similar to both Enke's and Phillip's work. 
Eversull [17] employed Royer's model in an empirical study 
18 
to show other practical applications of the model. 
Hypothetical cooperatives were simulated to analyze the 
optimality conditions and provide insight into cooperative 
management practices. By assuming that producer demand and 
supply functions were linearly related to basis values 
(prices), Eversull utilized quadratic programming to solve 
for optimal basis values that the cooperative should use. A 
cooperative enterprise selling two products and purchasing 
two products was set up as a base model that was solved 
under several scenarios. Modifications in the model were 
formulated to test changes in cooperative storage capacity, 
limits on basis values, and interrelated demand and supply. 
VanSickle [64] also utilized Royer's work and estimated the 
supply and demand equations represented in (1.3) for several 
commodities using data from Iowa cooperatives. This 
empirical analysis of the pricing and production nexus 
showed the validity and applicability of Royer's theoretical 
model. 
VanSickle [64] is the first work which addresses the 
cooperative decision nexus between production, pricing, and 
financing. Whereas VanSickle integrated these decisions 
into one model, previous work assumed the decisions to be 
independent. A submodel using Royer's work is used as the 
basis for the production and pricing decisions and a 
submodel which maximizes total collective profits of all 
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members is used to arrive at financial decisions. The study 
separated the cooperative decision nexus into three 
interdependent steps, (a) short-run determination of pricing 
and production practices, (b) long-run investment portfolio 
determination, and (c) determining the long-run cooperative 
financial structure. The production and pricing decisions 
were solved for by using an enhanced Royer model whereas a 
cooperative financial model was developed to answer long-run 
financial questions. The financial sub-model provided a 
membership function of the cooperative which in turn 
provided implications for long-run cooperative financial 
structure. The optimality conditions were derived, but as 
in the case of Royer's work, their complexity diminished the 
practical usage by cooperative decision-makers. VanSickle 
and Ladd [67] used the theoretical model presented by 
VanSickle [64] and derived optimal levels of qualified 
patronage refunds, stock dividends, revolving fund period, 
percent cash patronage refund, and the amount of cooperative 
debt by maximizing cooperative profits. The levels of 
pricing and production were assumed exogenous in the 
financial model of profit maximization. 
In a vein similar to VanSickle, Fischer [18] developed 
a model that consolidates the optimal production, pricing, 
and financing decisions of the cooperative decision-maker. 
Fischer goes further than Royer's and VanSickle's 
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normative-prescriptive study in that in addition to 
determining how cooperatives should be financed, a look is 
taken at how they are financed and why there are any 
discrepancies. Using an objective function similar to 
Royer [52], Fischer assumed that a typical cooperative 
member would maximize his expected after-tax "profit". 
After-tax profit for a member of a single-product farm 
supply cooperative is represented as: 
TT* = (Py*y - r(lf)d - p^Qp - p^q^)(l-Tp) + pvpr*q^ 
(1.5) 
where ir = expected after-tax "profit" 
* 
Py = expected farm product price 
y = output produced and sold by member 
r(lf) = interest rate on farm debt, a function of 
If = farm leverage (=d/e) 
d = farm debt 
e = farmer's adjusted net worth (= eb - ea) 
eb = farmer's book net worth 
ea = allocated equity owned by farmer 
p = market price of input q when purchased 
outside the cooperative 
p^ = initial cooperative price of input 
q = amount of q bought from non-cooperative 
^ sources 
q^ = amount of q bought from cooperative 
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T = producer's personal tax rate 
* 
pvpr = expected after-tax present value of 
per-unit patronage refunds 
Patronage refunds were specified in greater detail than by 
Royer [52] or VanSickle [64]. The specification of 
after-tax patronage refunds included terms to take into 
account dividends paid on allocated equity. Expected 
after-tax qualified patronage refunds were given as: 
pvpr"= pr"{s-Tp+(l-s)[[r^*(l-Tp)/kgg] + 
* 
where pr = expected book value of per unit 
refund 
s = percent of refund paid in cash 
(1-s) = fraction of refund retained as allocated 
equity 
Tp = member's marginal personal tax rate 
T = length of revolving fund period 
* 
r^ = expected dividend rate on allocated equity 
k = discount rate for expected after-tax return 
on allocated equity 
Assuming no dividends were paid on allocated equity, 
the ai:er-tax patronage refund equation is similar to the 
one used by Royer [52] and VanSickle [64] as represented by 
(1.7). 
pvpr*I =0 = pr*[s-T +(l-s)/(l+k yf] 
irc p ae (1.7) 
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Using q^, and d as choice variables the members 
could determine their optimal production and pricing 
decisions. With two markets for the producers' product, the 
determination of q^ and q^ depend on the prices between the 
two markets. Depending on the prices, if p^(l-Tp) is 
greater (less) than p^(l-Tp)-pvpr , the producer will 
patronize the private (cooperative) suppliers exclusively. 
Fischer then proceeds to work through the farmers' profit 
function using the minimum price of the good for the two 
markets and sets up optimality conditions concerning the 
usage of farm inputs between the two sources. The member's 
demand for an input is said to be a function of the expected 
price, the farmer's adjusted net worth and the producer's 
personal tax rate. Risk is then incorporated into the model 
by assuming that a producer's expected utility is 
* * 
represented as: EU = +(a/2) Var(n^ ) , where "a" 
represents a risk attitude measure. When "a" is less than 
zero the patron is said to be risk averse. 
A model of a single product farm supply cooperative is 
used to look at the cost of the cooperative's capital. 
Capital costs are first determined for a risk neutral member 
on a pre-tax and after-tax basis, then for a risk averse 
member on an after-tax basis. Similar to other studies, 
Fischer found that the cooperative's cost of capital was a 
decreasing function of leverage and that most cooperatives 
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should utilize more debt capital. A dynamic stochastic 
simulation analysis showed that increasing leverage would be 
both feasible and profitable for cooperatives that are 
earning an adequate return on assets. While Royer's model 
concentrates on the pricing and production decisions, 
Fischer as well as VanSickle also consider financial 
matters. 
VanSickle and Ladd [65] extend the work of VanSickle 
[64] by developing a simulation model to find the optimal 
financial decisions for the cooperative. Jones [30] thought 
the results of the VanSickle and Ladd model were different 
than would be expected and scrutinized their study. The 
problem of how to specify the cooperative objective function 
was pointed out. Jones specified an objective function that 
was different from that used by VanSickle and Ladd. The 
question is, which one is correct? VanSickle and Ladd [66] 
respond to Jones' concerns by developing a new model that 
r e c o g n i z e s  t h e  c o m p l e m e n t a r i t y  o f  t h e  d e f e r m e n t  p e r i o d  ( T )  
and the percent patronage refund paid in cash (s). 
Recognizing this complementarity, a two-stage synthesis of 
the VanSickle and Ladd model is formulated. The model first 
solves for the level of H, a composite variable defined as 
T(1-S), then the second stage solves for the actual values 
of T and s. Other possible models are also suggested. The 
two-stage model has a computational advantage over the 
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others. The model in this two-stage process involves 
solving a set of simultaneous equations that has at most one 
non-linear equation. The other models require solving a set 
of non-linear simultaneous equations. Noting the 
computational advantage of this two-stage synthesis of the 
VanSickle, Ladd and Jones model, the differential treatment 
model presented in this work will utilize this type of a 
procedure. 
Using the work of Royer, VanSickle, Fischer, VanSickle 
and Ladd, and Jones as the current status of cooperative 
modelling, a cooperative model of differential member 
treatment can be formulated. Each study provides an 
integral understanding of the cooperative that shou-ld be 
realized when formulating a model of cooperative behavior. 
Statement of Objectives 
The existing literature does a satisfactory job of 
explaining the optimizing behavior of cooperative and 
typical member patron decision-makers. Most cooperative 
decision-makers base their decisions on the assumption of a 
homogeneous rather than a heterogeneous membership. The 
existing literature is fitting when members are basically 
similar. However a significantly diverse membership exposes 
deficiencies in the literature. The objectives of this 
study are to provide decision-makers with a cooperative 
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model that allows for different types of members to be 
treated differently and to look at the feasibility, effects, 
and methods of differential treatment. Recognizing that 
Royer's [52] short run production-pricing model, and the 
production-pricing and finance models of VanSickle [64], and 
Fischer [18] had different objectives than this study, some 
aspects of their models will be used while others will not. 
The general model presented in this study will: (a) 
represent a multi-product marketing and supply cooperative, 
(b) allow members to patronize other businesses, (c) permit 
the cooperative to perform non-member business on a 
for-profit basis, and (d) include patronage refunds. This 
general model will be used to arrive at the optimality 
conditions that the cooperative decision-maker should strive 
for in setting production, pricing, and financial policies. 
The optimality conditions arrived at will yield the values 
of the choice variables that will maximize member profits 
which may or may not be equilibrium values. These 
optimality conditions will be similar to those presented by 
Royer [52] and VanSickle [64]. Both Royer's and VanSickle's 
models required extensive amounts of information and yielded 
complex optimality conditions. The Kuhn-Tucker conditions 
afforded by this model allowing for differential treatment 
among members will require even more detailed information 
from the cooperatives. Even though it may not be possible 
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to solve for all the optimality conditions of a specific 
cooperative, the general Kuhn-Tucker conditions can be 
solved which will provide general operating guidelines. The 
problem of needing large amounts of data can be partially 
circumvented by using simulation analysis which lends itself 
to this type of situation. Previous models use marginal 
analysis and linear programming methods to analyze 
cooperatives while only a few have used simulation. The 
work that has been done using simulation analysis has 
involved cooperative finance, but not the complete operation 
of a cooperative. A simulation model will be developed in 
Chapter V that will call for specific information from 
cooperative decision-makers and then proceed to show the 
effects of differential patronage refund and stock 
requirement policies. To set up a model that would 
determine a level of optimal differential treatment of 
members would require a large volume of information as well 
as subjective decisions on the allocation of member welfare. 
Therefore, these models are meant to give cooperative 
decision-makers a guide to help make comparisons concerning 
potential situations that could arise. For example, a 
cooperative contemplating a policy of differential treatment 
could use the model to simulate both the current and 
anticipated situations and compare them. The study attempts 
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to show the internal production, pricing and financial 
details of a cooperative that treats members differently. 
Although cooperatives may desire to treat members 
differently, a theoretical model that allows it to do so may 
be of no importance if the particular policy is not allowed 
for one reason or another. An examination of the practical 
side of differential member treatment must be done to 
determine the feasibility of such a policy. To determine 
the practicality of such a procedure the heterogeneity of 
cooperative members is analyzed. This study examines how 
members are different and if there is a basis for 
differential treatment. Even if members are different, 
other obstacles such as legality, compatibility with the 
Rochdale Principles, and the acceptability of the policy 
must be confronted. 
Following Chapters 
In Chapter II, the empirical justification for a 
cooperative model allowing differential treatment is given. 
In this chapter, emphasis is on the practicality of 
differential treatment. 
In Chapter III, a general theoretical model allowing 
cooperative member differential treatment is presented. A 
model of an individual producer with an assumed goal of 
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profit maximization is given as well as a cooperative model 
which maximizes the total profits of all members. 
In Chapter IV, the Kuhn-Tucker conditions for the 
general model are derived and interpreted. 
In Chapter V, a simulation model is presented which 
allows a cooperative manager to specify information that is 
appropriate for their cooperative. These models are 
intended to aid the cooperative decision-makers by providing 
different scenarios which can be compared. 
Finally, Chapter VI consists of a summary, conclusions, 
and suggestions for future research in the area of 
differential treatment of cooperative members. 
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CHAPTER II. THE BASIS FOR A THEORETICAL MODEL THAT 
ALLOWS DIFFERENTIAL TREATMENT 
OF COOPERATIVE MEMBERS 
Before building a cooperative model that allows 
differential treatment of members, some attention should be 
given to potential problems that may arise as a result of 
differential treatment. This chapter discusses some factors 
that establish the relevance and feasibility of such a 
model. Patron homogeneity, methods and effects of 
differential treatment, and program feasibility will be 
discussed. 
Patron Homogeneity 
The premise of a cooperative model that allows 
differential treatment of members is that patrons are 
heterogeneous rather than homogeneous. As stated earlier, 
most cooperative research has assumed that members are so 
similar as to be indistinguishable. In recent years the 
American agricultural sector as well as individual producers 
have become more specialized and diverse. Numerous studies 
[23, 40, 41] have shown that agricultural producers are 
non-homogeneous. Reports by Lasley and Goudy [40, 41] show 
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that the total number of Iowa farms has decreased during the 
period from 1969-1982, but that the decrease was not uniform 
across all farm sizes. Although mid-sized farms (50-499 
acres) are still the dominant size, they are declining in 
number while small (<50 acres) and large (>500 acres) farms 
are increasing in number. During the eight year span from 
1974 to 1982, mid-sized farms in Iowa decreased in number by 
20.2% while the number of small and large farms increased 
35.9% and 25.0% respectively. The trend for the United 
States as a whole parallels the situation in Iowa. In 1974, 
mid-sized farms represented 47.8% of all farms whereas in 
1982 they account for only 43.7%. The change in farm 
numbers and size indicates that agribusiness firms must 
acknowledge that the majority of producers are mid-sized but 
they must also be able to service an increasing number of 
both smaller and larger producers. Traditionally firms have 
aimed the majority of their services at a "typical" or 
mid-sized patron. However, the "typical" patron may not be 
so typical now. 
Even though farms having small acreages are increasing 
in number, the number of farms with small sales volume is 
decreasing. In general, the number of Iowa farms with sales 
volume greater than $40,000 are increasing and those with 
less than $40,000 are declining [61]. The same trend can be 
seen in the U.S., from 1978 to 1982 the number of farms with 
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sales volume over $100,000 has increased 132.8% while 
smaller sales volume farms had a relatively slower increase 
or a decline. The trend is for farms to market higher 
dollar volumes of agricultural products. Many firms now 
sell over $200,000 of products per year where only a few had 
this volume 10 years ago. This gives agribusiness firms a 
very broad spectrum of clients. Although many individual 
producers have high sales volumes, a market may still have 
to be provided to a declining number of low sales volume 
producers. Both the age distribution and amount of off-farm 
employment of United States farmers have remained rather 
stable in recent years [60]. Even though the age 
distribution is stable, agribusinesses must still serve 
producers ranging from beginning farmers to older 
established farmers who will soon retire. 
The age distribution of producers can have an impact on 
cooperatives through patronage refund policies. In Iowa 
approximately 40% of all cooperative members are over 55 
years of age with most still having considerable invested 
cooperative equity that should be retired as soon as 
possible after they stop patronizing the cooperative [21]. 
Depending on the cooperative's policy of retiring retained 
equity capital of past patrons, the cooperative could run 
into financial trouble if a large proportion of members 
retire within a short time span. The heavy concentration of 
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older members in cooperatives has the potential to cause 
such problems. Looking at a typical Iowa cooperative the 
diversity of producer patrons can be seen. An equity-age 
distribution obtained from a local cooperative, assuming it 
is representative, shows that there is substantial overall 
diversity of American producers in individual 
cooperatives [21]. Data from this cooperative showed that 
their membership age ranged from less than 15 to over 100 
years old. The analysis indicated that 25.6% of the members 
were less than 40 years of age and provided less than 13.5% 
of the total cooperative equity, 53.9% of the members were 
40 - 65 years old and supplied 69.9% of the total equity, 
and 19.3% of the members were over 65 and provided 13.7% of 
the cooperative's equity. If the percent of total 
cooperative equity supplied by a patron group can be used as 
a proxy for the amount of business done by that group, then 
it shows that the average business volume of patrons 40 - 65 
years old is greater than that for other age categories. 
This supports the notion that cooperatives do have diverse 
memberships that cover a large spectrum of age groups and 
patronage volumes. 
The degree to which farmers have off-farm employment 
can also divide producers into different classifications. 
In 1982, the number of U.S. producers who had no off-farm 
employment and those who worked off-farm over 200 days a 
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year were nearly equal [61]. The existence of full-time 
farmers and part-time farmers, again, leads to heterogeneity 
of producers. Another difference among producers is their 
locarion and distance from the cooperative or other market 
outlet. Members can be divided into groups based on their 
location relative to the cooperative. This is another 
possible criterion which could provide a basis for 
differential treatment. 
Assuming that cooperative patrons are typical 
agricultural producers, cooperatives could use farm size, 
sales volume, age, amount of off-farm employment, as 
differentiating characteristics of producers. The key issue 
in trying to group producers is to categorize them into 
groups that cost the same to service. This implies that not 
all ways of categorizing producers should be used for 
applying differential treatment. The use of a base capital 
finance plan utilized currently by some cooperatives bases 
differential treatment on use of the cooperative assets. 
This differentiating method will be discussed further in the 
section covering the Rochdale Principles. Even though 
producers can be divided into classes by these 
characteristics, some of these classification schemes can 
not legally or perhaps should not, on the basis of 
cooperative principles, be used as a basis for differential 
treatment. The model presented in Chapter III utilizes 
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patron classifications based on sales or patronage volume to 
form a model of differential treatment of cooperative 
members. 
Methods of Applying Differential Treatment 
The cooperative decision-maker has several possible 
methods of differentially treating patrons. Looking at the 
pricing and production side first, immediate and delayed 
methods are available. The most obvious method of 
differentially treating patrons is to offer different prices 
to members in the various classes of patrons. This 
immediate method of applying differential treatment requires 
knowledge about the producer by the clerk at the time of the 
sale. By using various patronage refund policies, the 
actual differential treatment can occur after the time of 
sale and would require less information by the clerk who 
makes the sale. The cooperative decision-maker can classify 
patrons and assign differing patronage refund policies. By 
allotting different deferment periods and different levels 
of cash patronage returned, the cooperative decision-maker 
can adjust the refund policy. 
Accounts receivable policies can be varied across 
different groups of patrons. This type of policy would 
allow the cooperative decision-maker to take into account 
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different levels of risk in extending credit to patrons. 
Differential treatment by requiring varying contributions of 
equity capital, such as base capital plans, is another 
method to consider. This is elaborated on in the section 
discussing cooperative principles. Other differential 
treatment plans could be devised and are most likely already 
being used by some cooperatives. The extent of this 
practice is not known since cooperative managers may not 
readily admit doing this. Any method of differential 
treatment must abide by the laws governing cooperative 
operation, adhere to cooperative principles, and be operable 
on a business basis. 
Feasibility of a Cooperative Using Differential Treatment 
Legality 
If a hypothesized plan to differentiate members is to 
be employed, it must be legal. The plan must be able to 
differentiate patrons and meet certain legal requirements. 
Otherwise, a plan to treat members differently may turn into 
an unjustified policy of patron discrimination. 
The practice of differential member treatment has not 
been explicitly tested in the legal system. There have been 
no edicts or court rulings on this issue. Harl [25b] makes 
no mention of this subject. However, existing statutes may 
36 
yield some legal precedent. The statute that probably has 
the most impact on cooperative member differential treatment 
is found in the United States Code 135.02 '§(3) 
IRC §1388 (a) (1) which requires that dividends must be paid 
to the patron "on the basis of quality of the value of 
business done with or for such patron" [62]. This can be 
interpreted as meaning the cooperative must pay dividends in 
a uniform manner to patrons who have similar cooperative 
business value. That is, a cooperative can differentially 
treat dissimilar patrons if it is "value" or cost-justified. 
Another potential legal problem exists if there is a 
requirement that the percent cash patronage refund and the 
length of the deferment period for a given product must be 
equal for all members. Additionally, if a cooperative 
wishes to qualify under the section 521 of the Internal 
Revenue Code, then the cooperative must treat ALL patrons, 
members and non-members "alike" [25b]. An argument can be 
made that even though the product may be the same for all 
patrons, the cooperative has different costs associated with 
the provision of the product and can charge different 
prices. The average cost of servicing a very small volume 
patron, or an infrequent patron, may differ from the cost of 
servicing a large volume patron with regular business. The 
argument is that each patron should be responsible for 
paying the full cost of providing the goods or services that 
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he demands. By recognizing that different groups of patrons 
may cost the cooperative different amounts to service, 
varying levels of percent cash patronage refunds and lengths 
of deferment periods may legally be used for such patrons. 
The model presented in Chapter III allows the cooperative to 
assign different percentage cash patronage refunds and 
length of deferment period to different groups of members. 
Adherence to cooperative principles 
Another concern related to differential treatment of 
members is its consistency with cooperative ideals as 
established by such cooperatives as the Rochdale Pioneers. 
If cooperative principles are grossly violated, the 
cooperative way of doing business would be breached raising 
concerns about their legal existence or protection under 
current laws including the Capper-Volstead Act of 1922. The 
original Rochdale Principles of 1884 have evolved over time 
with some of the principles becoming obsolete and 
disregarded while others have been modified to remain 
current. A brief review of the cooperative principles as 
established by the original pioneers and their original 
intent is presented to discern the implications for 
differential treatment of cooperative members. 
Open membership When the Rochdale cooperative was 
formed in 1844 the founders wanted to have an open society 
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without any form of discrimination. These pioneers were 
interested in equality for all members. The Chartists, a 
political group whose main goal was to provide voting rights 
to all people, may have supplied the inspiration for this 
ideal [51]. Even though they had an open membership 
policy, they did have several qualifications regarding this 
principle. First, a maximum number of members (250) was 
allowed into the cooperative (possibly to enhance the social 
structure of the organization). Secondly, although open 
membership was a stated policy, membership could still be 
denied or revoked for those who had "bad character or 
habits" and/or who did not meet their social and economic 
responsibilities for the cooperative. Currently, this 
principle has been modified or altogether relaxed. Today 
cooperatives can have either a closed or open membership 
policy with most having the latter. The closed membership 
policy is used mainly when a cooperative needs to control 
the supply of its members' product. The open membership 
policy as seen today must be qualified. Anybody can apply, 
however membership may not be automatic. The patron may 
have to apply and/or prove his qualifications to become a 
member. On the other hand, any member can exit the 
cooperative membership by simply discontinuing patronage 
with the business. This principle was originally fashioned 
with a sociological goal in mind, "equality of members", yet 
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with a fixed maximum membership it could have some economic 
effects on the cooperative operations. Today most 
cooperative scholars emphasize the sociological aspects of 
open membership while de-emphasizing its importance as an 
economic principle. 
Differential treatment would have no direct effect on 
the open membership principle. No members would be excluded 
with such a policy. In fact a situation could exist where 
differential member treatment would support an open 
membership policy. For example, some members may feel they 
are "mistreated" if they are treated in the same way others 
are. These members may be economically coerced into leaving 
the cooperative to do business elsewhere. Differential 
treatment could also coerce some members to discontinue 
patronizing the cooperative, but it still stands that 
differential member treatment does not directly violate the 
open membership principle. 
One man - one vote The idea of one man - one vote 
was so basic to the Rochdale founders that it was not even 
mentioned in their original statutes of 1844. By 1845, 
however, this idea was made more than a common assumption 
when the statutes were amended. It was believed that voting 
should not be based on the amounts of an individual's 
capital stock, but rather on the individual person. 
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Cooperatives utilizing the one man - one vote concept did 
more than create member equality. By operating in this 
manner, member interest, control, and participation in the 
cooperative was stimulated. Charles Fourier, Robert Owens 
and the Chartists had earlier promoted this form of 
democratic control. Torgerson [57, p. 11] stated the 
importance of this principle as, "if liberty, equality, & 
freedom are indispensable in democracy, then it must also be 
needed in economic organizations". 
The change from a strict one man - one vote policy to a 
system of voting based on patronage exhibits a parallel to 
cooperative member differential treatment. Realizing that 
all members may not be equal, cooperatives may give more 
voting rights to those with greater patronage levels. From 
an economic viewpoint, a cooperative can treat various 
groups of cooperative members differently while retaining 
the one man - one vote principle. 
Cash trading Cash trading as an economic operating 
principle has almost been completely abrogated. Many 
cooperatives have even begun issuing their own credit cards. 
When the Rochdale Pioneers instituted this principle, the 
economic environment imposed the concept of assuming minimal 
levels of risk. At this time in England (1840-1850), credit 
sales were running rampant and caused many over extended and 
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unstable businesses. Credit difficulties led to the failure 
of the original cooperative at Rochdale in 1835 [1, p. 49]. 
The fate of this cooperative must have lingered in the minds 
of these founding pioneers because they decided that a 
strict cash policy was an appropriate method to control cash 
flow problems. Although cash flow problems are still major 
concerns, other precautions such as better business 
projections and cautious credit extension can alleviate this 
problem. Non-cooperative forms of business may also have 
led to cooperatives adopting a credit policy. If 
cooperatives failed to extend credit, non-cooperatives with 
credit policies would have a competitive economic edge in 
obtaining a potential patron's business. Abandoning the 
cash trading principle has not caused much concern. As 
mentioned earlier, one potential method of differential 
treatment is allowing various levels of credit to patrons. 
Originally any type of credit policy was in violation of the 
Rochdale Principles. Since this principle is not strictly 
followed currently, further infringement of offering various 
levels of credit to patrons is a moot point. 
Membership education Both Robert Owens and William 
King were staunch believers in education of their society 
members [51]. The Rochdale Pioneers, realizing that they 
were a special type of organization, knew that to succeed 
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they had to educate their members on cooperative philosophy. 
To begin with, few members knew of the advantages and 
disadvantages of a cooperative, let alone the operating 
principles of a cooperative. To alleviate this ignorance, a 
fixed percentage of profits (2.5%) was earmarked for 
educational purposes [1, p. 61]. Slowly a strong 
educational program developed which not only was directed 
towards members, but also managers, employees, boards of 
directors, and the general public. Today the need for 
cooperative education is as crucial as ever. Every 
cooperative member needs to know his rights and 
responsibilities within their cooperative. Non-members also 
need to understand the cooperative ideals. As cooperatives 
are becoming larger and more complex, the training of 
managers and board members becomes an even more crucial 
task. Cooperative education was not stressed in the United 
States until the latter 1920s [37]. Many people see it as a 
noble objective, however not as a cooperative principle, 
without proper cooperative education programs, this type of 
business form could die a slow death [68, p. 11]. Members, 
directors, management, and employees need to know how their 
cooperative operates while the public has to at least have a 
general understanding of the cooperative philosophy. 
Membership education may provide the key to a 
successful program of differential treatment of members. If 
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potential and present patrons do not understand the reasons 
for treating certain patrons differently, confusion and loss 
of cooperative goodwill may result. A strong education 
program that explains why patrons may receive different 
prices, refunds, or treatment, would help minimize the 
potential turmoil of such a policy. The lack of a capable 
education program prior to enactment and thereafter could 
spell the doom of even the best policy of member 
differential treatment. 
Political and religious neutrality A goal closely 
related to equality of members is that of political and 
religious neutrality. Even though they seem similar, they 
were set up for different reasons. Being a very 
heterogeneous group, the cooperative founders wanted to 
avoid any political or religious squabbles among themselves 
which would adversely affect their business. This principle 
can be traced back to a resolution on neutrality passed by 
the 1832 English Cooperative Congress [51]. The Chartists, 
being atheists, also were decisive on the inclusion of this 
idea. By the nature of this principle, it would probably be 
better called a recommendation. Although it may be a 
commendable practice to follow, even from the start it has 
not been piously upheld. Violations have been blatant. 
Several times cooperative political parties have been formed 
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to serve member interests. Today many cooperatives are 
represented by special interest lobbyist groups. The 
cohesion of members for a united effort is important. Any 
division of the membership could jeopardize the economic 
well-being of the cooperative. The issue of cooperative 
political involvement is not clear cut. There are arguments 
for and against. It may segregate the members but, on the 
other hand, one duty the cooperative has is to represent its 
members as a group, even if it is in the political arena. 
The issue of neutrality has always been controversial and 
difficult to abide by, and in today's cooperative it may be 
even more so. If the intent of the political and religious 
neutrality principle was to ensure cohesion of the 
cooperative membership, differential treatment of members 
certainly may cause disunity. Maintaining harmony among 
members when the cooperative uses a differential treatment 
may depend on how the policy is initially set up and the 
quality of the educational program. Differential member 
treatment based on political or religious leanings of 
patrons is an obvious violation of the Rochdale Principles. 
Treating members differently based on economic traits such 
as patronage volume, credit risk, or location may violate 
the intent of this principle if proper educational programs 
are neglected and member cohesion is lost. 
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No unusual risk assumption When the Rochdale 
cooperative was formed the original members had only a 
limited source of capital. Since the initial amount of 
capital was minimal, extreme care regarding the financial 
operations was crucial to survival. Small amounts of 
capital coupled with an initial condition of unlimited 
liability created an atmosphere of extreme caution. Even 
though cooperative members gained limited liability status 
in 1852, financial risks were still a primary concern. This 
principle is very difficult to justify as a bona fide 
cooperative principle. How is unusual risk defined and how 
is this risk measured? Cooperatives may be no different 
from non-cooperatives in that both may generally prefer less 
risk. One way to interpret this principle is to say that 
cooperatives should tend to be a conservative form of 
business. 
There is no clear violation of this questionable 
principle with differential treatment. One could also look 
at the risk involved when a cooperative does not treat 
members differently. Will treating preferred patrons more 
favorably be worth the risk of losing patronage of the 
relatively less preferred patrons? On the other hand, is 
the risk involved in treating all members similarly unusual 
considering that this may cause some preferred patrons to 
exit the cooperative? Prima facie, differential treatment 
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of cooperative members does not violate the principle that 
no unusual risk should be taken. There may be risk involved 
in utilizing a policy of differential treatment yet with the 
problems in defining "unusual risk" and measuring it, its 
use is not precluded. 
Limited interest on stock Unlike other types of 
corporations, cooperatives are formed to provide services to 
patron members rather than to benefit investors in the 
business. Cooperatives were never meant to provide an 
outlet for capital investment. Their sole purpose is to 
serve members. Capital should be supplied by members to run 
the business without any expectations of benefiting greatly 
from interest on capital stock. The benefit of supplying 
cooperative capital comes from the services provided by the 
cooperative. Looking at Emelianoff's theory on equality, if 
all members were equal, no interest would have to be paid to 
maintain fairness. The reason the Rochdale Pioneers 
accepted this principle of Robert Owen's was to show that a 
member's capital contribution was only a means to an end, 
that of providing a service. Originally it was limited 
interest on "stock" while today it is interpreted as limited 
interest on "capital". Returns to capital investment are 
limited in order to maintain cooperative control based on 
patronage rather than investment. For this principle to be 
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meaningful, the limit must be binding. Since the capital 
market conditions have changed since the inception of the 
Rochdale cooperative, the limit has also changed from 5% to 
8%, the value of 8% is obtained from the Capper-Volstead Act 
of 1922. The Capper-Volstead Act enabled the cooperative 
form of business to exist, however several operating 
conditions had to be met. One of these requirements is that 
either the one man - one vote principle or the limitation of 
annual dividends to 8% be used. Some states require both of 
these conditions to be met. 
There is the possibility that members can be paid 
varying rates of return on capital stock. However, some 
minor difficulties may arise. When cooperatives already pay 
the maximum allowed rate, only by reducing stock dividends 
of some can members be differentially treated. It may be 
more appealing to cooperative members if some return rates 
were increased and others held constant rather than lowering 
some and holding others constant. Differential treatment 
via capital stock returns would not be applicable to 
non-stock cooperatives or those not paying a return on 
capital stock. Even though varying rates of capital stock 
returns may not work for all cooperatives, it may be a 
feasible method for most. 
The intent of this principle is to preserve patron 
control of the cooperative by discouraging outside 
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investment and is unaffected by differential treatment 
policies. A type of differential policy which violates this 
principle is one that allows voting privileges 
disproportionate to member patronage. This would also be in 
violation of the one man - one vote principle discussed 
earlier. 
Goods should be sold at regular retail prices One 
risk that the Rochdale cooperative did not want to incur was 
that of starting a price war. If they sold their goods at a 
price less than the going retail price, competitors could 
have retaliated by lowering their short-run price, possibly 
in an attempt to drive the cooperative out of business. 
Goods were priced at the going market value and any profit 
was returned to the members. Today, there are two 
cooperative pricing schemes. One is selling at the same 
price other retailers charge and returning a refund later. 
The second is selling at the cooperative's true cost. The 
former method is used primarily when management can not 
accurately predict cost of operations in advance, when 
patronage refunds are paid in a lump sum at the year's end 
to provide financial stability, and when management believes 
only members should receive the benefits of the cooperative 
prices. The latter pricing method may be preferred when the 
cooperative desires to disrupt the market pricing system. 
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encourage new membership, or when costs are reasonably 
predictable. With the original intent of this principle 
stated as "to avoid price wars", obedience .to this principle 
may not be crucial today. Individual cooperatives need to 
devise their own business strategies and if it calls for 
stiff price competition, then they should act in their best 
interest. If the price being charged by competitors is 
excessively high, there is no reason why a cooperative 
should have to do likewise. Charging varying "regular 
retail prices" is one obvious way to apply a policy of 
differential treatment. Cooperatives are independent 
business firms that can make pricing pricing decisions any 
way the cooperative members deem reasonable. "Regular 
retail prices" for individual patrons can be different if 
they are cost justified. 
Limitation on the number of shares owned Even 
though a limited return was established on capital stock, 
the Rochdale Pioneers also desired to control the numbers of 
shares owned by individual members. The intent of this 
principle was to yield equality of control to the members. 
Even though there are criticisms of this principle, it is 
widely accepted today. The primary criticism is that it is 
not needed. If a strict policy of one man - one vote and 
limited returns on invested capital are followed, the number 
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of shares owned by a single member is unimportant in the 
control of the cooperative. The second criticism is that it 
is meaningless for non-stock cooperatives. These criticisms 
show the non-necessity of this principle. 
Some cooperatives use a base capital financing plan 
which requires each patron to supply a certain amount of 
capital based on his patronage level. This base capital 
plan is a type of differential treatment since those who 
utilize the capital assets of the cooperative more provide 
proportionately more equity. With no differential treatment 
policy, an interesting predicament arises for the 
cooperative decision-maker when he considers the fair price 
and financing responsibilities of patrons. For example, it 
could be argued large volume patrons should receive a higher 
price for their products and should supply relatively more 
equity capital. It follows that when all members finance 
the cooperative equally and receive the same prices, large 
volume producers realize benefits with respect to financing 
since they utilize the cooperative equity capital more fully 
while on the other hand they realize a "loss" in the product 
price they receive. Conversely small volume patrons benefit 
from higher product prices received but must pay 
disproportionately more for the use of the cooperative 
capital. The trade off between these pricing and financing 
gains (losses) should be considered when devising a 
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differential treatment policy. If larger quantities of 
stock are required for some patrons the complete picture of 
the patron must be considered. Some cooperatives have 
already used a type of differential member treatment by 
using a base equity capital plan. There does not seem to be 
any discrepancies between using differential financing 
treatment and limiting the number of shares owned. 
Considering that the limit on the number of stock shares 
owned by each patron was intended to keep the cooperative 
control in the hands of the users, differential financing 
treatment should not be precluded. 
Net margins are distributed according to patronage 
The Lennox Town Society in Scotland (1812) was the first 
verified consumer's cooperative to use patronage 
refunds [51]. The Rochdale Pioneers perceived their 
cooperative only as an extension of their individual 
businesses. The net earnings of the cooperative belonged to 
the members and was distributed back to the members 
according to their patronage so no one would gain at 
another's expense. The cooperative wanted to be fair to all 
members no matter what their volume of business with the 
cooperative was. Emelianoff emphasized this in his theory 
of cooperation by saying that cooperatives operated not 
necessarily on the principle of equality, but more so on the 
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idea of proportionality. Another crucial aspect of this 
principle is the idea that a cooperative earns no profit for 
itself. It operates at cost and returns the net margins to 
the patrons. Since not all patronage comes from members, 
the cooperative can decide whether or not to distribute 
patronage refunds to these non-members. This is not always 
an easy decision. If the cooperative wants to obtain the 
benefits of being organized under Chapter 521 as outlined by 
VanSickle and Ladd [67], patronage refunds need to be 
distributed to members and non-members alike. 
Net margins are distributed back to patrons in the form 
of patronage refunds. The value of each member's patronage 
refund depends on the level of patronage (member 
determined), the amount received in cash for the year's 
trading, and the length of the revolving fund used by the 
cooperative. The cooperative decision-maker could vary the 
percentage cash patronage refund or the length of the 
deferment period to differentially treat members. As long 
as the cooperative distributes net margins, the 
permissibility of differential treatment should not be 
questioned with respect to this principle. 
Even though the present principles of cooperation are 
not always well-defined, or agreed upon, the principles of 
operation at cost, member ownership and control, and limited 
returns on equity are universally accepted as the 
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distinguishing characteristics of a cooperative firm. With 
some care and planning, a policy of differential treatment 
of cooperative members can be used while upholding these 
predominant principles as well as the intent of all the 
Rochdale Principles. 
Acceptance by members 
In addition to considering the legality and adherence 
to cooperative ideology of differential treatment of 
cooperative members, the policy must be acceptable to the 
members. The policy must be acceptable to the majority of 
the patrons and be able to be implemented. In the decision 
to implement a policy of differential treatment, the 
decision-maker must acknowledge the consequences that it 
will have on the cooperative. The decision-maker should 
acknowledge membership implications, program equitability, 
and legal issues. The implications of a differential 
treatment policy on membership is probably the most 
important issue the decision-niaker must consider. Sines 
cooperative membership is voluntary, patrons can join or 
leave any time they wish. The cooperative will try to 
satisfy patron needs and most likely try to maintain or 
increase its membership. When members are homogeneous, a 
single operational strategy will attract or deter all 
patrons and potential patrons alike. Cooperatives with a 
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differential treatment policy because of a heterogeneous 
membership must simultaneously try to cater to the needs of 
various patron types in order to maintain the current 
membership. Problems arise when some members perceive 
others to be treated more favorably for no apparent reason. 
The cooperative decision-maker must be in touch with the 
total membership because when a group of members feels 
slighted too much, they may not mesh together with other 
groups and one may secede and start a new organization. It 
should be noted that this type of tension can arise even 
without a policy of differential treatment. With a policy 
of differential treatment, some members may be treated "more 
favorably" than others because the value of business done 
with the cooperative is greater. Since cooperative 
membership is voluntary, with or without a policy of 
differential treatment, changes in the membership will 
depend to some extent on cooperative operating practices. 
The sole purpose of differential treatment is to eliminate 
or reduce "unjust" treatment of patrons. However, in this 
process previously "favored" members may be slighted and 
vice versa. The cooperative decision-maker should reflect 
upon the change of membership stratification when 
implementing a policy of differential treatment. An obvious 
factor in determining who will retain membership and who 
will leave rests on the loyalty of the members. Loyalty is 
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a function of many factors ranging from the years of 
cooperative patronage to the existence of alternative 
markets. The greater the degree of cooperative loyalty, the 
less apt a member will consider terminating membership. 
When contemplating policy changes the cooperative with a 
high degree of member loyalty will have less fluctuation in 
membership as compared to those with very fickle patrons. 
French et al. [20, p. 237] predict that member commitment 
(loyalty) will increase during the period of 1978-1987 since 
more cooperatives are making use of marketing agreements and 
contracts. To assess the membership implications of 
converting to a policy of differential treatment of members, 
membership loyalty should be considered. 
As discussed earlier there are some legal questions to 
consider with differential treatment policies. If the 
cooperative must pay equal proportions of cash patronage 
refunds, would some members voluntarily accept less and 
receive other remunerations? In using the cost differences 
in providing goods to members as the basis for differential 
treatment, can this cost schedule be ascertained? These 
questions and others should be considered when the 
cooperative decision-makers contemplate a differential 
treatment policy. 
The feasibility of differential treatment of members 
rests on its adherence to cooperative principles, its 
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compliance with legal regulations, and its acceptance by 
members. These three inter-related concerns must be 
confronted in implementing a differential treatment policy. 
Each area may generate barriers to successful differential 
treatment, yet each might be overcome. Despite the 
potential problems, a program of differential treatment is a 
possible strategy that should be considered by all 
cooperatives. 
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CHAPTER III. DEVELOPMENT OF THE ECONOMIC MODEL 
The model developed here is intended to provide 
cooperative decision-makers a framework with which to allow 
differential treatment of members and analyze its 
consequences. Using models developed by Royer [52], 
VanSickle [64], and VanSickle and Ladd [66] as a foundation, 
mechanisms allowing members to be treated dissimilarly along 
with ideas from Fischer's [18] and Jones' [30] work are 
combined to form a new model. The major difference between 
the previous works and this model is in their ability to 
look at a typical individual member versus looking at 
different groups or types of members. Unlike previous 
models which are based on the assumption that members are 
homogeneous and therefore should all receive the same prices 
and patronage refunds, this model is based on the fact that 
cooperative members are heterogeneous and could receive 
different prices, patronage refunds, or dividends on stock. 
The procedure to be followed in building the model will be 
to look at the individual producer first and then construct 
a cooperative firm model which is a summation of individual 
objective functions that incorporates some additional 
constraints. The model extends the previous work by 
integrating the production-pricing and the financial models 
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developed by others. To integrate the two models the timing 
of the production-pricing and financial decisions must be 
considered. Chronologically the first decisions made are 
those for the production and price levels of the 
cooperatives inputs and outputs. These are made at the 
beginning of the fiscal year. These decisions will affect 
the values concerning quantity and net savings. The 
cooperative then operates for its fiscal year with these 
production-pricing levels. At the end of the fiscal year 
the cooperative will make decisions that determine the 
financial structure and how patronage refunds are allocated. 
These decisions ultimately affect membership numbers. The 
next step is to determine the next year's production-pricing 
decisions using the changes in the cooperative's financial 
structure from the previous fiscal period's financial 
decisions. 
The Individual Producer 
Assuming individual producers wish to maximize profits 
subject to production constraints, a Lagrangian function can 
be set up for each cooperative patron. The producer's 
objective (profit) function and production function are set 
up in a general form to be applicable for both member and 
non-member patrons. These functions are general enough to 
allow for differences among patrons yet do not force 
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heterogeneity of members on the cooperative decision-maker. 
The model will allow all patrons to be different or they can 
all be similar. The model assumes that there are "m" 
different patron groups in the cooperative where "m" is 
greater than or equal to one but less than or equal to the 
total number of cooperative members. 
Objective (profit) function 
A given member or group of similar members will have a 
profit function represented as; 
( 3 . 1 )  
where Tp^ is the marginal tax rate for the n-th patron 
group, p^^ and q^^ are the price and average quantity of the 
i-th product for the n-th group of patrons, where X is the 
set of outputs produced by the members and non-members and 
Y is the set of variable inputs purchased by the members and 
non-members, fc^ is the fixed costs of the average producer 
in the n-th member or non-member group, ds^ is the dividends 
on stock held by the average producer in the n-th member or 
non-member group, and pvpr^ is the present value of the 
patronage refunds allocated to the average patron in the 
n-th group. The dividends on stock can be defined as; 
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ds = SH^IC PS (3.2) 
n n n n 
where SH and PS represent the number of shares of stock 
n n 
owned by a member of the n-th group and its corresponding 
price. This variable can represent voting, non-voting, 
preferred stock or any other types. IC^ represents the 
corresponding dividend rate as a percent of the stock price. 
There are certain limitations on these stock dividends 
depending on the cooperative's status. A cooperative 
organized under Chapter 521 must not exceed 8 percent per 
annum or the State of incorporation's maximum rate. Unlike 
521 cooperatives, a non-exempt cooperative can pay rates 
greater than 8 percent per annum as long as the applicable 
State does not impose a limit, and a one man - one vote 
system is used. 
Since all cooperatives can be set up differently, there 
are many classes of stock that could be employed. For 
example, a cooperative may have voting stock which may or 
may not pay any monetary rate of return. Other types of 
stocks with or without voting privileges may also be offered 
by the cooperative. The model presented here utilizes only 
one type of stock; however, any number of stock types can be 
added to accommodate each individual situation. 
The present valve of the patronage refunds (pvpr^) can 






< = [SN-TPN+ ] ( 3 . 4 )  
(1+d,)'» 
where is the proportion of allocated patronage refunds 
paid in cash for the n-th patron group leaving the 
proportion (1-s^) deferred into a revolving fund of length 
for after-tax cash flows of the n-th patron group. C is the 
set of outputs (from set X) sold to and the set of variable 
inputs (from set Y) purchased from the cooperative by the 
expected per-unit patronage refund. The expected per-unit 
* 
patronage refund for each product for each patron (r^^ ) can 
be represented solely as a function of past per-unit 
patronage refunds (r. r. _«,...) as done by 
Royer [52] and VanSickle [64], or by these past per-unit 
refunds and other criteria as done by Fischer [18]. Fischer 
argues that Royer's extrapolative assumption on expected 
refunds is not proper since they are not rational. It was 
argued that producers have more information available to 
them in deriving this expectation and will use it to get a 
* 
more refined valve for r^^ [18, p. 64]. Using this 
additional information to arrive at an expected per-unit 
for the n-th patron group, and d^ is the discount rate 
patrons, and r. 
in 
is the n-th patron group's individual 
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return is theoretically correct yet may become 
computationally overly burdensome if r^^ is a function of 
many other factors. Treating r^^ as an extrapolative 
expectation may not be totally correct theoretically, 
however it is plausible and certainly more convenient. 
This analysis assumes that all patronage refunds are 
allocated in a qualified form, therefore all tax liability 
rests on the patron. Per-unit capital retains, qualified 
and unqualified, along with unqualified patronage refunds 
are not incorporated into the model for several reasons. A 
model incorporating these ideas is developed by Fischer 
[18, p. 112]. Per-unit capital retains are similar in 
nature to deferred patronage refunds. Both are based on 
levels of patronage and have analogous tax consequences. 
Unqualified patronage refunds and unqualified per-unit 
retains yield an initial tax liability to the cooperative 
which is later transferred to the patron when they are 
redeemed. Unlike their qualified counterparts, unqualified 
patronage refunds and per-unit retains have no certain 
redemption date which would make them difficult to model. 
Finally, and maybe most importantly, allocated patronage 
refunds are the most typical form of raising equity capital 
through patronage. Understanding differential treatment of 
them can be generalized to other forms of equity financing. 
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By looking at specific member's rather than typical 
member's prices, quantities, fixed costs, dividends on stock 
and present value of patronage refunds, some of the 
ramifications of differential treatment can be analyzed. 
The cooperative decision-maker's choice of p. , ds , s , and 
^in n n 
for all products for all member types and the resulting 
effects can be evaluated. The method of determining the 
levels for these choice variables should be communicated to 
the patrons once it is established. 
Constraints (production function) 
With a knowledge of their profit function, the producer 
can look at their own specific production function to 
determine optimal levels of production. The individual 
producer's production function is assumed to be a 
single-valued continuous function with continuous 
first-order and second-order partial derivatives. This 
strictly concave production function for member and 
non-member type "n" is specified in the implicit form as; 
*n " *n(Sxn' ^^Yn' ^Wfn^ " ° (3.5) 
where qy^,and q^^^ are respectively the vector of 
quantities of outputs in set X produced, variable inputs in 
set Y used, and fixed inputs in set Wf used by the n-th 
patron group. Another set of constraints related to the 
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production function comes from the fact that each producer 
can utilize only the amount of fixed inputs that is 
available. This availability constraint is given as; 
where is the stock of the i-th fixed factor available to 
the n-th patron group. Using this well-behaved production 
function and fixed factor availability constraint the 
optimal levels of output and variable input usage for 
individual patrons can be determined. 
Lagrangian function 
With both the objective function and constraints 
specified for individual producers the Lagrangian function 
can be set up. The Lagrangian function will be represented 
as a maximization of a producer's profit function subject to 
both production and fixed factor availability constraints. 
This is given as; 
ieWf ( 3 . 6 )  
+ 4n(qxn' ^Yn' ^Wfn^ 
( 3 . 7 )  
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where and '^2in Lagrangian multipliers corresponding 
to the production function of the n-th patron group and the 
i-th fixed factor constraint of the n-th patron group. To 
find the optimal levels of production and factor usage, the 
producer must choose which markets to use. The producer, 
unless bound by a marketing agreement, can use both 
non-cooperative and cooperative markets to sell products or 
to buy variable inputs. 
The notation X , X , Y , and Y represent subsets of X 
c o c o 
and Y where the subscript "c" denotes patronage of 
cooperatives and the subscript "o" represents business done 
with other firms. The producer can utilize either 
cooperative markets, non-cooperative markets, or both. 
Solutions can be found for where the subscript "i" 
represents products in sets X and Y. The Kuhn-Tucker 
conditions for this model are similar to those of Royer [52] 
and are only briefly presented in this study. Having 
developed the producer submodel, the next step is to develop 
the cooperative submodel in a similar fashion. 
The Cooperative 
Since the cooperative's sole purpose is to operate for 
the benefit of its patrons, the construction of the 
cooperative submodel is similar to the individual producer's 
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submodel. In addition to specifying an objective function 
and constraints, other factors must be considered in 
specifying the cooperative model. The cooperative 
decision-maker must consider the determination and 
distribution of net savings which will affect the financing 
of the cooperative. The most convenient way to understand 
the patron-cooperative relationship is to use a diagram 
showing the flow of products, cash, and patronage refunds 
within the model. Figure 3.1 illustrates the model of a 
cooperative association and the relationship between the 
cooperative and its patrons. It should be noted that this 
figure is the same as VanSickle's Figure 2.1 [64, p. 17] 
except that it explicitly states that there are various 
groups of member and non-member patrons. 
In Figure 3.1, Y represents a set of variable inputs 
purchased by the producer, X is a set of products sold by 
the producer, V is a set of inputs purchased by the 
cooperative from outside markets, Z is a set of products 
sold by the cooperative to outside markets, and Wf is a set 
of fixed inputs available to the cooperative. Figure 3.1 
shows the general flows of goods. However, it does not show 
the flows to different types of members. Figure 3.2 looks 
at a simple corn marketing cooperative that details the 
movement of products, prices, and patronage refunds to four 
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Figure 3.1. Model of the cooperative association 
(adapted from VanSickle, Fig. 2.1, p. 17) 
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The groups of patrons in this example are based on the 
two factors of volume and membership. The four categories 
of producers are large volume members, small volume members, 
large volume non-members, and small volume non-members. 
These groups can sell their corn in either cooperative 
or non-cooperative markets, however they must purchase their 
inputs from non-cooperative firms. The only patronage 
refunds paid in this model are when member patrons sell corn 
to the cooperative. This is similar to previous models 
except the member patrons fall into two distinct groups and 
may receive different patronage refunds, either in the 
immediate cash portion (imm) or the amount held in the 
revolving fund (def). These members must also provide 
initial capital stock or membership fees which may or may 
not return dividends. 
The cooperative purchases corn from these four producer 
groups, pays the going market price, and provides patronage 
refunds to members. In turn the cooperative sells the corn, 
or some processed form of it, to other firms for direct cash 
payments. These other firms could conceivably be other 
cooperatives which could differentially treat its members, 
the locals, via its patronage refund policy. To operate the 
cooperative, labor is hired from outside firms and paid 
market wages. Depending on the financial status of the 
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Figure 3.2. Model of a simple corn marketing cooperative 
70 
In the context of Figure 3.1, the sets of goods in this 
simple model are: = {corn}, = {corn}, = {null}, 
= {corn production inputs}, V = {labor to operate 
cooperative}, Z = {corn meal}, and Wf = {fixed processing 
facilities owned by the cooperative}. This illustration is 
for a very simple cooperative yet it does show the product, 
cash, and patronage refund flows. The following section 
attempts to generalize the flows through a multi-product 
marketing and supply cooperative model that has "m" 
different homogeneous groups of patrons. 
Production-pricing objective (profit) function 
The cooperative decision-maker's objective function is 
the maximization of the profits of all members. This is not 
saying that the cooperative maximizes its own profit. When 
all members are homogeneous, maximizing total member profit 
is obviously consistent with the maximizing a single 
member's objective function. When members are 
heterogeneous, maximizing total profit is still the 
cooperative decision-maker's goal even though individual 
members' profits will vary according to their value to the 
cooperative. Members who cost less to serve, may receive 
relatively higher prices than others who cost more to serve. 
The cooperative decision-maker offers prices for products 
according to the value of the patron's business which in 
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turn provides producer's with corresponding revenues. Even 
though each member may receive different prices, maximizing 
total profits of all members is a reasonable objective. 
Following this logic the profits of all cooperative members 
can be defined as: 
- 2 N (1-Tp ) [fc - ds ] + 2 N pvpr (3.8) 
n£A n n n n ^ * 
where is the number of homogeneous members in the n-th 
group of patrons, A is the subset of patrons who are full 
members, (B is the set of all patrons), fc^ is the total 
fixed costs of the average member patron in the n-th group, 
ds is the before tax dividends on member stock for an 
n 
individual in the n-th patron group, and pvpr^ is the 
after-tax present value of the allocated patronage refunds 
for the average producer in the n-th patron group. Total 
fixed costs, dividends, and after-tax present value of 
allocated patronage refunds (FCM, DS, and PVPR) are found by 
summing fc^, and pvpr^ over all patron groups in set A. 
Production-pricing model constraints 
There are several constraints for the 
production-pricing model. The cooperative's production 
function is the first constraint that will be considered. 
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The cooperative production function is analagous to the 
individual producer's. In implicit form, the production 
function can be stated as: 
*(Qz, Qy. Qx' Qv' Qwf) = 0 (3.9) 
where is a vector of quantities of the outputs in set Z 
produced by the cooperative and sold to buyers outside the 
cooperative association, Qy is a vector of quantities of the 
variable inputs in set Y purchased by the individual 
producers. is a vector of quantities of the outputs in 
set X produced by individual producers and used by the 
cooperative, Qy is a vector of quantities of each of the 
variable inputs in set V used by the cooperative and 
purchased from outside the cooperative association, and, 
is a vector of quantities of the fixed inputs in set Wf used 
by the cooperative. 
The production function is only one of the constraints 
in the production and pricing model. Others pertaining to 
full use of purchased goods, availability of fixed inputs, 
member patronage agreements, and linkage to a financial 
model are needed. All products purchased by the cooperative 
from patrons, set X, must be fully utilized. These goods 
must either be sold back to patrons (set Y) or sold to 
outside cooperative markets (set Z). This full utilization 
constraint is represented as: 
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for all ieX (3.10) 
The availability of fixed factor constraints assures 
that the cooperative does not use more of these inputs than 
it owns. This constraint is given by: 
where q^; ieWf, is the level of fixed factor "i" available 
to the cooperative. 
Cooperatives must limit the amount of non-member 
patronage. The Capper-Volstead Act restricts non-member 
business for marketing cooperatives to less than one-half of 
total cooperative business. There may be state statutes 
that also limit the amount of non-patron business. Because 
there are so many different rules involved in this modelling 
non-patronage level, this type of constraint will not be 
used. This study will not address this non-patronage limit. 
If the cooperative utilized the non-patronage limit as 
defined by the Capper-Volstead Act, the constraint would be 
given as: 
for all iEWf (3.11) 
Z 
i EC n 
( 3 . 1 2 )  
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The final constraint deals with linking the 
production-pricing model and the finance model. This 
constraint specifies the amount of net savings that will go 
into a revolving fund to provide operating capital for the 
cooperative. The constraint is expressed as: 
N = Z (1-s )[a (NS - rD) - N ds ] - rD (3.13) 
neA " " " " 
where N is the amount of net savings to be used in the 
revolving fund, is the proportion of cooperative 
operating income (NS-rD) allocated to the n-th patron group, 
NS is the cooperative's net savings, r is the average 
interest rate of cooperative debt, D is the level of 
cooperative debt, and ds^ is dividends paid on stock for 
each member of the n-th patron group. Since cooperative net 
savings are used in the determination of patronage refunds, 
NS will be considered in more depth. 
Determination of net savings 
The determination of net savings is a result of the 
concept of cooperatives operating at cost. Net savings 
before taxes from cooperative operations can be used as 
patronage refunds, dividends on stock, unallocated reserves, 
educational funds, or payment of income taxes. The 
allocation of net savings is determined at the end of the 
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fiscal year however the level to be distributed is 
determined from the production and pricing decisions made at 
the beginning of the fiscal year. 
Since most cooperatives have several departments which 
may or may not be independent, it is necessary to determine 
net savings for each of these departments. The two types of 
departments in this model, marketing and supply, have 
different methods to determine net savings because of their 
innate nature. Equations representing the net savings of 
the individual marketing and supply departments are given in 
Appendix B. The net savings equations presented here and in 
Appendix B are directly analagous to Royer's [52] work 
except for the inclusion of varying prices and quantities of 
products pertaining to different groups of members. The net 
savings of a cooperative as a whole is the sum of the net 




k = Z p.q. -  ^  p. q. - FCC (3.14a) 
ieZ ^ ^ ieV ^ ^ 
where FCC is the total fixed costs of the cooperative. 
NS is equal to the sum of the value of products sold outside 
the cooperative, the value of products sold to patrons, less 
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the value of products purchased from the patrons, less the 
value of products purchased from outside the cooperative, 
and less the total fixed costs incurred. The relationship 
between net savings and patronage refunds is the next step. 
Equation (3.15) represents this relationship. 
where PR^ is the amount of patronage refunds allocated to 
each member of the n-th group. Equations (3.16) discounts 
the patronage refunds and (3.17) sums these discounted 
patronage refunds across all member groups. 
It should be noted that NS and N are the only terms that 
n 
can vary in the right hand side of (3.12) and (3.17), the 
other terms are fixed. The levels of these fixed terms are 
determined by the previous year's financial decisions or 
simply as givens for the initial run. Substituting (3.17) 
into (3.8), the cooperative's production-pricing objective 
function becomes 
(3.15) 





- Z [N (1-Tp ) (fc - ds ) + I N ds ] + (NS-rD) E a s' 
neA " " neA " ^ n^A "  ^  
(3.18) 
Using (3.18) as the relevant objective function, the 
production-pricing Lagrangian can be formed. 
Production-pricing model Lagrangian 
- E [N (1-Tp ) (fc - ds ) + E N ds ] + (NS-rD) Z a g' 
n£A " " " ^ nCA ^ * nCA " * 
+  ^2^  [ "^  ( ; Qy ' ^ X' ' Q^ f)^  
iEWf 
+ X [N - I  (1-s )[a (NS-rD) - N ds ] - rD] (3.19) 
n£A 
Using (Pj^j^, i£X,Y), (q^, i£Z], and i£V, Wf; j£Y^,Z} as 
instrument variables, the Kuhn-Tucker conditions can be 
derived. The Kuhn-Tucker conditions for the cooperative 
production-pricing model are given and interpreted in 
Chapter IV. 
Financial model objective (profit) function 
The objective function for the financial model, like 
the production-pricing model, is the cooperative's profit 
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function. The financial and production-pricing objective 
functions are different in that the former has financial 
variables directly incorporated. Two notable differences 
are in the determination of qualified patronage refunds and 
the inclusion of stock activities. The objective function 
for the financial model is presented by: 
N = T(M,K) 
+  c :  -  \  -  T p „  +  7 7 7 ^ 1  
n eA (1 + d^) 
- Z Tp N IC SH PS (3.20) 
n e k  'n n n n 
where T(M,K) is the total net revenues generated by the 
cooperative exclusive of the revenue from patronage refunds 
and stock dividends. T(M,K) depends on the total membership 
(M) and the total amount of capital used (K). NS is the 
cooperative's net savings as defined by (3.14). The terms r 
and D represent the average interest rate of all cooperative 
debt sources and the total debt employed by the cooperative. 
The terms IC , SH and PS are respectively the dividend 
n n n 
rate, the number of shares of stock required, and the 
purchase price of the stock for each member in the n-th 
patron group. Noting the complementarity of the number of 
shares required and the price of that stock, further 
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references to stock prices will not be differentiated 
between members. T(M,K) is defined by equation (3.21) 
n£A " " iEX 1" isY in in neA " " " 
T(M,K) = Z N„(l-TpJ[ Z p,„q,„ - E P,„q, J - Z N„(l-Tp^)fc 
(3.21) 
The second and third line of (3.20) represent the discounted 
present value of cooperative member patronage refunds and 
stock dividends. 
Financial constraints 
The production function represents one constraint on 
the cooperative however other constraints are needed for the 
cooperative financial model. Several sources of capital are 
available to the cooperative including sales of stock, funds 
held back from operations, and debt sources. Capital 
obtained through operations such as patronage refunds and 
per-unit retains is the most common method of cooperative 
financing. VanSickle and Ladd [67] state that nearly 85 
percent of cooperative equity capital is obtained this way. 
Even though it is commonly used, sales of stock and the use 
of debt sources may be more preferred by members [14]. A 
use and source of capital constraint must be formed. That 
is, the amount of capital used must equal the level that is 
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provided. An approach looking at changes in the sources and 
uses of capital each year is used. 
The amount of capital utilized by the cooperative each 
fiscal year is represented as: 
K = CS + TKQP + D (3.22) 
with 
CS = Z N (SH PS) (3.23) 
nEA " " 
TKQP = PKQP + KQP (3.24) 
KQP = Z N (1-s ) PR (3.25) 
neA " n n 
where D is the level of cooperative debt for the year, CS is 
the total value of stock employed by the cooperative for the 
year, TKQP is the total capital supplied by retained 
patronage refunds from the current (KQP) and all previous 
year's (PKQP), KQP is the total value of the capital 
supplied by qualified patronage refunds for the given year, 
s^ is the proportion of allocated patronage refund paid in 
cash for the n-th patron group, and PR^ is the amount of 
patronage refunds allocated to the n-th patron group. The 
patronage refund term (PR^^ can be represented as: 
PR = [a /N ][NS - rD] - IC SH PS (3.26) 
n n n^ n n 
Substituting (3.23), (3.24), (3.25) and (3.26) into (3.22) 
yields : 
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K = I N SH PS[l-(l-s )IC ] + PKQP + Z (i_s )a [NS-rD] + D 
n£A ^ " n n nSA " " 
(3.27) 
Other financial constraints that must be dealt with 
pertain to the percent of patronage refunds paid in cash, 
the allowable interest rates paid on capital stock. These 
constraints are represented by: 
s > 0.2 (3.28) 
n — '  
s^ < 1.0 (3.29) 
IM 2 IC^ (3.30) 
A final constraint for the model is to fix the level of 
net savings at the amount determined by the production-
pricing model. This constraint is taken care of by 
retaining the terms of the production-pricing model that 
determine this value, with solution values that are already 
known. Using all these constraints, the Lagrangian function 
Financial model Lagrangian function 
Given the objective of maximizing total collective 
member after-tax profits subject to the aforementioned 
constraints, the Lagrangian function can be written: 
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n = T(M,K) 
.  (NS - r.)j^ - Tp„ .  
- z Tp N IC SH PS 
n n n n 
n £A 
+ a.{K - Z N SH PS [l-(l-s )IC ] - PKQP 
nEA " " n n 
- Z (1-s ) [NS-rD] - D} 
n e k  ^  ^  
+ Z.*2n[Sn - 0.2] 
n eA 
neA 
+ Z Ô [IM-ICJ (3.31) 
neA 
It should be noted that if t equals zero, then s must 
n ^ n 
equal one. 
The instrument variables used by the cooperative 
decision-maker are: s^, stock prices, and stock 
dividends. These instruments yield Kuhn-Tucker conditions 
that are presented in Chapter IV. The theoretical model 
developed above is slightly different than the application 
model discussed later. The application model utilizes the 
most current literature on modelling cooperative finances. 
The previous theoretical model was developed before this 
literature was available. The generalized theoretical model 
used for the application will be presented however the 
83 
resulting Kuhn-Tucker conditions will not. These 
Kuhn-Tucker conditions can be found in VanSickle and 
Ladd [66]. The procedure used to solve this model involves 
maximizing two separate objective functions given by (3.32) 
and (3.33). 
L, = T(M,K) + Z (1-Tp )[N QPR + IC PS SH ] 
2  p .  n ^  n  n n n - *  
n =-A 
+ Z d (1-Tp )[N H QPR + PS SH ] 
, n ^nr n n^ n n n 
n eA 
+ 5c (K - I [H QPR - PS SH ] - D} 
5 n^ n n n 
n EA 
+ 6. {0(M,K) - I [QPR - IC PS SH ] - rD) 
^  O C A  °  n  n  n '  
+ sr Z (IM-IC j (3.32) 
n£A " 
+ J/7„ 
+ J/Sn [I-nl + I  Sn t=„-0.21 (3.33) 
n EA n EA 
Equation (3.32) maximizes the sum of cooperative member's 
profits. The instrument variables for this Lagrangian 
include QPR^, IC^, X^, and D. The second equation (3.33) 
maximizes the present value of qualified patronage refunds 
using the values of QPR^ and H^ obtained from solving 
(3.32). The choice variables used in (3.33) are and s^. 
This two-stage model is discussed again in Chapter V. 
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CHAPTER IV. ANALYSIS OF THE THEORETICAL MODEL 
The preceding chapter presented the theoretical models 
for a cooperative enterprise but does not provide any 
interpretation or implications for cooperative behavior. 
The purpose of this chapter is to derive the model's 
implications for optimizing behavior by deriving and 
interpreting the profit maximizing Kuhn-Tucker conditions. 
The interpretation of the Kuhn-Tucker conditions are 
basically similar to those of VanSickle [64] with some 
differences arising because of the possibility of 
differential treatment of members. The existence of 
differing groups of patrons who can be treated dissimilarly 
gives the decision-maker more instrument variables which can 
be used in determining the optimizing behavior of the 
cooperative. 
Individual Patron Model 
The model of an individual cooperative member or 
non-member patron presented in this work is basically the 
same as put forth by Royer [52]. This work considers that 
specific patrons can and will typically have different 
operating conditions and optimizing behavior to maximize 
profits. Each patron will use the quantities supplied and 
demanded of products in sets X , X , Y , Y , and Wf to 
c o c o  
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maximize their profits. Using these quantities as choice 
variables the following set of Kuhn-Tucker conditions can be 
derived. 
for all i£X^: 
= (l-TP.) Pin + + »ln : ^ ° Kn (1+4.) '"in 
(4.1a) 
q = 0 (4.1b) 
S^in 
^in  ^  ° (4.1c) 
for all i^X : 
o 
3An 
= (1-Tp„) Pi„ + *1. T-^- < 0 ('•.2a) 
'"in '"lir. 
3 An 
— —  q .  = 0  ( 4 . 2 b )  
asin "  
^in  ^  ° (4.2c) 
for all iEY^: 
3 An (l-Sn) * 9<Pn 
—  = (Tp„-U P,„ .  — < 0 
^in n ^in 
( 4 . 3 a )  
3 A 
q.^ = 0 (4.3b) 
*4in 
q^n 2  0 (4.3c) 
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for all icY : 
o 
3A 9<f> 
IT-*- = (TPn-l) Pin + ^ (4.4a) 
*4in SSin 
3A 
— ^ q. = 0 (4.4b) 
q. > 0 (4.4c) 
in — 
for all i^Wf: 




q. > 0 • (4.5c) 
in — 
* i „ =  
3A 




71 = 'in - 1i„ i ° (4-7*) 
°*2in 
3A 
^ 'in - ° 
2in 
*2in  ^  0 (4.7c) 
Interpreting (4.1a), (4.1b), and (4.1c) implies that 
the patron's marginal cost of producing each output sold to 
the cooperative should equal the price paid plus the 
87 
discounted present value of expected patronage refunds 
associated with cooperative patronage. This condition holds 
for members and non-members alike but the latter will simply 
not expect any patronage refunds. The interpretation of 
(4.2a), (4.2b), and (4.2c) is analagous to (4.1a), (4.1b), 
and (4.1c) except now patrons will equate the marginal cost 
of production to the price paid by other firms. The 
Kuhn-Tucker conditions for all ieY and all iEY are 
c o 
interpreted as setting the marginal value product of each 
input equal to the net price paid for the input. Expected 
patronage refunds enter into (4.3a), (4.3b), and (4.3c) and 
can lower the net cost of the input, (4.4a), (4.4b), and 
(4.4c) are similar except there are no patronage refunds 
received. The level of fixed factor usage is determined by 
(4.5a), (4.5b), and (4.5c) and indicates that; if the i-th 
fixed factor is used, its imputed value is equal to its 
marginal value product. Conditions (4.6), (4.7a), (4.7b), 
and (4.7c) yield the production and fixed factor 
constraints. 
The results for the individual are simple extensions of 
previous work whereas the next step, the cooperative model, 
is where more interesting results arise. By summing across 
all of the individual) patrons, the cooperative 
production-pricing model and financial model can be 
discussed and interpreted. 
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Production-Pricing Model 
Previous production-pricing models used prices and 
quantities of goods as decision variables but do not enable 
the decision-maker to select different values for dissimilar 
patron groups. Realizing that the decision-maker can set 
varying prices and quantities for specific groups of 
patrons, the instrument variables for the production-pricing 
model are: 
p f o r  a l l  j e X ,  n c B  
p for all jCY, nCB 
qj for all j£Z 
q^^. for all i eV, j£Y,Z 
q^j for all ieWf, jeY,Z 
In the following Kuhn-Tucker conditions it should be 
noted that NS is represented by equation (3.14). The 
Kuhn-Tucker conditions for the pricing-production model are: 
for all jeX^, neB 
3L 9q. 3q. 




+ I [ds + (1-Tp )(fc - ds )] — — 





+  ^ c t s {  Z [ Z  p . q .  -  Z  p . q .  ]  
nCA " " m£B i£Y i£X 9p. 
c c ^ jn 
+ Z 
3$ 3N 
[ ^ q. 
3q. 
i£X,Y 3q. tn£B 3p . 
in ^jn 
" + N_ — —] 
" 3p, jn 
+ ^ [N in 
iex 2i n 
+ z 




+ Pi„ g 






jn i£X *Pjn 
3N 
c c jn 
- ^ ds 
3N 
m 
m^A 3 p . jn 
} < 0 (4.8a) 
3L 
D  . =0 
* jn (4.8b) 
jn 
Pjn  ^  ° (4.8c) 
for all jEY, n^B 
9L 
= N (1-Tp )[ 2 p. 
'q. 
in 
Pjn "'^iEx'i" 3p. jn 
- Z 
iEY 







+ ^ (i-Tp„)[ ^ p,-„q,-„ -  ^  p,-„q,-„] 
m 





+ î [ds^ + (l-Tp_^)(£c^ + ds )1 -
'Pja m 
1 • 
+  Q ' s N [ q .  +  2  p .  —  
n  n  n i ^ j n  . ^ i n  g  
c ^ jn 
•] 
n 
X  l  
' "i" 9p. 
c ^ jn 
3N 
+ et s  { [ Z [ Z p. q. - Z p. q. ] —— 
c c ^ jn 
3$ 3N 3a . 
—  + N 
^ iEX.Y Sqin 3p^.^ ' "" 3p, jn 
• :... 
+ ^ [N„ 
i^X ^ SPjn •" "••• *Pjn 
3 
+ +j/in ^  
jn 
'q . 
- ^ _ Z p. 
3, 
^in 





c c ^ 
3N 
jn 
Z ds ——) < 0 
mEA * Bp. ~ 
• jn 
( 4 . 9 a )  
j. '  " ( 4 . 9 b )  
( 4 . 9 c )  
ail j£Z 
Z et s  p. + 
nSA n " :  ^ 
9$ 
- A Z ( 1-s )(<^ p.) .< 0 
n EB 
n nrj 
( 4 . 1 0 a )  
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3L 
q. = 0 (4.10b) 
Qj > 0 (4.10c) 
for all i£V, j£Y,Z 
9L 30 
= L *nS;(-Pi) + \ \ ^ ° 





q.. = 0 (4.11b) 
''ij ' 
q^j 2 0 (4.11c) 
for all iEWf, jeY,Z 
3L 3$ 
= < 0 (4.12a) 
3L 
q. . = 0 (4.12b) 
q.j > 0 (4.12c) 
3X^ 
for 
= *(Qz, Qy, Qx' Qy Qwf) = ° (4.13) 
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N - I (1-s ) [ ct (NS-rD) - N ds ] - rD = 0 
n I n n n  ^ 
(4.16) 
The Kuhn-Tucker conditions in these forms are very 
detailed and show all the considerations which must be dealt 
with in optimizing cooperative profits. Using the procedure 
employed by Royer [52] these Kuhn-Tucker conditions can be 
put into a form that is more concise and comprehendible. In 
(4.8a), (4.8b), and (4.8c) the price of the j-th output sold 
by the n-th patron group is used as the instrument variable. 
It follows that the number of Kuhn-Tucker conditions of this 
form is the number of products in set X multiplied by the 
number of different member groups. This work differs from 
Royer's [52] and VanSickle's [64] work since they considered 
only a one-dimensional array of Kuhn-Tucker conditions (j^X) 
whereas this work considers a two-dimensional array (jcX 
and n efi). 
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All the Kuhn-Tucker conditions that are in the form of 
(4.8a) can be re-written as: 
for all jEX, nEA 
3L 9p . 3q . 3q . 3q. 
jn jn ^jn ^jn ^jn 
jn 
3N^ 
+ Z (ds„ + (1-Tp_^)(fc^ - dsj] 
m£A 3p . 
+ *nSnMn[.^y Pin^in '^Pjn +^jn "icX 
c ^jn ^jn ^jn 
3N 
+ Vn't Pimli» -.L Pimlim' 
ra£A i£Y iEX 3p . 
c c jn 
3$ 3N 3 q. 
S X [ Z q —S- + N —^ ] 
i 3\Y 3q.n m 3;,. Bp,. 
3q. 3N 
f Z X,. [N + z q. —S-] 
1£X " 3p. m 3p. 
^jn ^jn 
3p . 3q . 3q. 
+ ^,{(l-s )ot [(p + q IS-) + Z p in 
n n jn jng g _ i EX ^"Sp . 




+ S (1-s )a [ Z ( Z P -  0. -  ^  D .  q. ) ——] 
nCA " mEB iCY ^^x 3p . 
c c ^ jn 
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- I ds ——) < 0 (4.17) 
ra eA n Bp. 
jn 
This form may not appear any more comprehendible; 
however by looking at each term this Kuhn-Tucker condition 
can be explained more easily or with less difficulty. The 
first two lines can be interpreted as the variation in 
revenues received by the n-th patron group from the j-th 
product caused by patron's output shifts induced by changing 
the corresponding price paid the member, less the variation 
in costs for the j-th product of the n-th patron group 
caused by shifts in factor usage of the n-th patron group 
which was induced by changes in the price of the j-th factor 
for the n-th patron group plus the change in revenues caused 
by changes in the number of patrons in the different groups. 
The third, fourth, and fifth lines deal with the net savings 
of the cooperative and can be interpreted as the change in 
the present value of net savings associated with the costs 
and revenues in the first and second lines. Before 
analyzing the remaining lines, the meaning of the Lagrangian 
multipliers must be determined. Care must be used when 
interpreting when jeX, it is the marginal variation in 
profit arising from the change in the quantity of the j-th 
input used by the cooperative. Conversely, can be 
interpreted as the marginal variation in profit arising from 
the change in the quantity of the j-th cooperative output 
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when jeY. The term on the sixth line is interpreted as the 
variation in cooperative profits caused by changes in the 
quantities of the i-th output (factor) caused by the change 
in the price of the j-th output (factor) for the n-th patron 
group, summed over all patrons. The seventh line represents 
the variation in cooperative profits from the transformation 
of products in set X caused by a change in the price of the 
j-th good for the n-th patron group, summed over all 
patrons. The Lagrangian multiplier would be interpreted 
as the marginal variation in cooperative profit arising from 
a change in the net savings constraint. The remaining lines 
are interpreted as the variation in cooperative member 
profits from a change in the amount of deferred patronage 
dividends arising from output shifts caused by changing the 
price of the j-th product for the n-th patron group. 
The affects of changing the price of the j-th output 
for the n-th patron group can be seen in Total Private 
Revenues (TPR), Total Private Costs (TPC), Total Collective 
Revenues (TCR), Total Collective Costs (TCC), and Total 
Member Profits (TMP). Total Private Revenues are the 
revenues obtained from the sale of all goods in set X by the 
entire group of member patrons. The effects on TPC of 
changing the price of the j-th good in set X for the n-th 
patron group in set A can be divided into three aspects: 
(a) the own effect, 3q. /9p. , (b) the cross product effect 
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for the n-th member group, o^in/^Pjn' where ieX, ij^j, and 
(c) the change in membership numbers, SN^ySpj^. Total 
Private Costs are the costs associated with the purchase by 
member patrons only of all goods in set Y. The effects on 
TPC of changing the price of the j-th good in set X for the 
n-th member group in set A deal only with the cross effect 
of the n-th member group, 3q^^/9pj^ where i^Y, and the 
change in membership numbers, ^N^ySpj^. Total Collective 
Revenues include all revenue obtained from the sale of all 
goods in set X by the entire group of patrons in set B. The 
effects on TCR of changing the price of the j-th good in set 
X for the n-th patron group in set A is again divided into 
three parts: (a) the own effect 3q^^/3pj^, (b) the cross 
product effect for the n-th member group, 9q^^/3pj^ where 
isX, and ifj, and (c) the change in membership numbers, 
3N /3p . . Total Collective Costs are those costs associated 
m J n 
with the purchase of factors from set Y by all patrons in 
set B. The effects on TCC of changing the price of the j-th 
good in set X for the n-th member group in set A include 
only the cross effect of the n-th member group, 3q^^/9pj^, 
where i £Y. Total Member Profits are affected by (a) changes 
in cooperative production via 9q^^/3pj^ where i GX, Y, n-B, 
and membership changes (b) the transformation of factors 
into products in set X by all patrons and (c) the change in 
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the amount of deferred patronage dividends (DP) via 
3q^^/3pj^ where i£X,Y, n^B and membership changes. 
The Kuhn-Tucker condition (4.17) indicates that in 
order for a decision-maker to maximize member profits, the 
sum of the variation in TPR of all members from sale of all 
goods in set X, the variation in TPC of all members from 
purchases of all goods in set Y, the variation in TCR of all 
patrons from purchases of all goods in set Y, the variation 
in TCC of all patrons from sale of all goods in set X, the 
variation in TMP caused by the change in levels of outputs 
and factors in the production function, the variation in TMP 
caused by the change in the transformation ratio, and the 
variation in TMP caused by the change in amount of" deferred 
patronage dividends by changing levels of output and factor 
usage by the n-th patron group should be set equal to zero. 
Using the above interpretation (4.17) can be re-written as: 
for j&X, n^A 
3L 3TPR 3q. 8TPR SN 9TPC 9q. 3TPC 9N 
= I{ Z [ 2-]- Z [ 
9p. m ieX 3q. 3p. 8N 9p. ieY 9q. 9p. 9N 9p. 
^ jn ^in ^jn m '^jn ^in ^jn m ^jn 
9TCR 9q. 9TCR 9N 9TCC 9q. 9TCC 9N 
+  l {  I  [  2J1+ z [ HL_+ 5Ï-] ) 
m ieY oq.' 9p . 9N 9p . iEX 9q. 9p . 9N 9p . 
^in ^jn m *^jn ^in ^jn m '^jn 
9TMP 9a. 9TMP 9 q .  
+ ( Z _ z 12 ) 
i EX 9q. 9p . i EY 9q. 9p . 
^in ^jn ^in *^]n 
9TMP 9q. 9TMP 9N 
- { Z lis. } + z z 
i EX 9q. 3p . iEXjY m 9N 9p . 
^in ^jn m ^jn 
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STMP 9DP 9q. 9DP 3N 
- { ^ [ — •+ < 0 (4.18) 
ieX,Y 9DP 3q. 3p. 3N 9p. 
in ^jn m ^jn 
Since this analysis is similar to that used by Royer [52] 
and VanSickle [64], only the methodology relevant to this 
model is repeated here. An indepth explanation of this 
methodology can be found in these two studies. 
The procedure used to interpret (4.8a) can also be used 
to analyze (4.9a), (4.10a), (4.11a), and (4.12a). Instead 
of working through each step here, the final form and the 
interpretation for the decision-maker will be given. 
Equation (4.9a) can be restated the same way as (4.8a), 
however it is interpreted differently. The interpretation 
differs in how the changes in TPR, TPC, TCR, and TCC are 
initially derived. For (4.8a) the changes arise from a 
change in the price of the j-th good in set X paid to the 
n-th patron group, whereas for (4.9a) the impetus for change 
is derived from varying the price of the j-th factor in set 
Y paid by the n-th patron group. 
The interpretation of (4.10a) can be more easily 
understood by writing it in the form given by (4.19). 
for jEZ 
9L 9TPR 9TMP 9TMP 9DP 
= + + = 0 (4.19) 
9q . 9q . 9q. 9DP 9q. 
J J J J 
In this concise form, the decision-maker will maximize 
profits by setting equal to zero the sum of the following 
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terras: the sum of individual members' present value of the 
total marginal revenue of the j-th product in the set of 
outputs produced by the cooperative and sold to 
non-cooperative buyers, the direct variation in TMP caused 
by the change in the level of the j-th good in set Z sold, 
and the indirect variation in TMP caused by a change in DP 
which is caused by the change in the amount of the j-th good 
in set Z. 
It should be noted that when an input is used to 
produce a product in sets Y or Z (q^j > 0 for ieX; jcY, Z), 
the marginal profit of using the input must be equal for all 
outputs since is a constant for all "j" outputs. 
By rearranging (4.11a), it can be written as:" 
for all icV; jEY, Z 
3L 3TPC 9TMP 3TMP 3DP 
= + + = 0 (4.20) 
3q.. 3q.. 9q.. 3DP 3q.. 
To maximize profits the decision-maker should set equal 
to zero; the total marginal factor cost to the cooperative 
of using the i-th variable input (purchased outside the 
cooperative association) taking into account its present 
value assuming each of the M patrons can have varying 
s^, and d^, the variation in member profits from changing 
(ieV; jeY, Z), and the variation in member profits from 
a change in DP caused by the change in q^^ (ieV; jeY, Z) . 
Similar to the interpretation of (4.11a), when an input 
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purchased from outside the cooperative is used to produce a 
product in set Y or Z, the marginal cost of using that 
factor should equal the marginal profit gained. Again, this 
marginal profit should be equal for all outputs produced 
with inputs from set V. The interpretation of (4.12a) 
indicates that, for a maximum level of profit, the 
decision-maker should set the variation in profit caused by 
the change in the amount of the i-th factor in set Wf to 
produce outputs in sets X or Z equal to the shadow price of 
the i-th fixed factor. 
The Kuhn-Tucker conditions represented by (4.13), 
(4.14), (4.15), and (4.16) recreate the original constraints 
imposed on the objective function. The production 
constraint is given by (4.13) which is in implicit form. 
Equations (4.14) and (4.15) respectively specify that all 
the unprocessed products in set X purchased from patrons is 
transformed into final products and that all fixed factors 
of production are exhausted in the production process. The 
last constraint is represented by (4.16) and states that a 
specified amount of capital from net savings is deferred in 




The instrument variables for the financial model are 
different from those for the production-pricing model. To 
maximize profits of all members the cooperative 
decision-maker can utilize several different instrument 
variables including the proportion of patronage refunds paid 
in cash to individual patrons the length of the 
deferment period for each patron (T^), the price of stock 
sold to each patron group by the cooperative (PS), the level 
of dividends paid to each patron group for stock (IC^), and 
the percentage of total operating income allocated to each 
member group (a^). This model is not meant to be a model of 
cooperative investment so the the level of total capital 
employed by the cooperative (K) is used as a parameter not 
as an instrument. Since there are different choice 
variables for the production-pricing and the financial 
models, these two models are built in a step-wise manner. 
The decision variables in one model may be fixed in the 
other. 
The Financial model Lagrangian function is stated as: 
V = T(M,K) 
n^A (1 + d ) 
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- Z Tp N IC SH PS 
n n n n 
n EA 
+ 6 (K - Z N SH PS [l-(l-s )IC ] - PKQP 
1 nSA ° " 
- Z (1-s )a [NS-rD] - D} 
nEA ^ 
+  -  0 - 2 ]  
n t-A 
+ L'sntl-» - =nl 
n £A 
+ Z 6 [IM-IC ] (3.31) 
nEA " 
The Kuhn-Tucker conditions for the financial model are: 
3 V 3N 
= - E Tp IC SH PS —-
3s mEA m m m 
n n 
1 
+ (NS-rD)O [1 _ —] 
(1 + d ) 
3N 
- î  ^  [SH^PS -
m °s 
n 
+ N IC SH PS + G (NS-rD)} 
n n n n 
+ -  ^ 3. 2 0 <4.21a) 
3V 
s = 0 (4.21b) 
3s " 
s^ > 0 (4.21c) 
3 V 3N 
= - Z Tp IC SH PS —-
3T mEA ° M G 3T 
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( 1-s ) 
- (NS-rD)a [ ^  ln(l+d )] > 0 (4.22a) 
^  (1+d^ )  ^  
3V 
T = 0 (4.22b) 
T >0 (4.22c) 
n — 
9V 9r 
— = Z a s'[- D — - r] 
3D neA " " 3D 
3r 
+ ô,{- Z [(l-s^)(a^[- D — - r] + 1} > 0 
n EA 3D 
(4.23a) 
9V 
— D = 0 (4.23b) 
3D 
D 2 0 (4.23c) 
37 3N 
= - I N Tp IC SH - S Tp IC SH PS —-
3PS nSA ^ ^ ^ mEA ^ m in gpg 
3N 
- L [sH.fs u - ci-s„)ic„i] 
m c-D Orb 
+ Z N [SH - (1-s )IC SH ]} > 0 (4.24a) 
n"- n n n n ' — 
mEA 
37 
PS = 0 (4.24b) 
3PS 
PS > 0 (4.24c) 
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3V 9Nm 
= - E N Tp SH PS - z TP IC SH PS 
3IC ncA " * " meA 3IC 
3N 
" 'l' [1 - (l-sJICJl 
"" n 
+ N (1-s )SH PS} - <5, >0 
n n n An — 4
3V 
IC = 0 
9lC ^ 




= - Z Tp IC SH PS 
3a meA ® 3a 
9 r 




-  * ! (  :  [SH,PS [1  _  ( l -Sn) IC ,^ ]  
m 3a 
n 
+ (l-s^)(NS-rD)} > 0 
a = 0 
n 
a > 0 
n — 
= K - E N SH PS [1 - (1-s )IC ] - PKQP 
96^ nEA ° ^ " 
- Z (1-s )a (NS-rD) - D} = 0 
nEA " * 
3V 
= s - 0.2 > 0 
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3V 
= 0 (4.28b) 
= «2. 




= 1.0 - > 0 (4.29a) 
63^ = 0 (4.29b) 




= IM - IC^ > 0 (4.30a) 
6^^ = 0 (4.30b) 
*40  >  0  (4 .30c )  
Before analyzing the financial model Kuhn-Tucker 
conditions, the meaning of the Lagrangian multipliers must 
be determined. In general, the Lagrangian multiplier will 
represent the change in the objective function resulting 
from a one unit change in the constraint constant. The 
first Lagrangian multiplier, 6^, shows the change in the 
objective function caused by a unit change in capital 
employed. Similarly, 6^^ represents the change in the 
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objective function caused by a one unit change in the 
maximum value of dividends payable to stock. The 
multipliers ^2^ and together represent the change in the 
objective function from either a one unit change in the 
maximum or minimum value of s . It should be noted that 
n 
only one of the partial derivatives with respect to or 
can equal zero for a maximum. 
Noting that must be a positive value, since its 
value must be confined to the range of 0.2 and 1.0, (4.21a) 
can be written as an equality. The interpretation of 
(4.21a) suggests that a cooperative decision-maker who wants 
to maximize member profits should set the following sum 
equal to zero: (a) the change in member profits by a change 
in membership numbers caused by a change in s^ via changes 
in total private sales revenues, present value of patronage 
dividends by changing the amount distributed, dividends on 
stock, and total collective profits from a change in 
capital, (b) the change in present value of net savings 
caused by a change in the present value factor, (c) the 
variation in total collective profits from a change in 
capital induced by a change in s^, and (d) the shadow price 
of s^. Written in equation form as: 
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where TCP is the total collective profits, PVNS is the 
present value of net savings, TCP is the total collective 
profits, and SPs^ is the shadow price for s^. This 
condition should be met for all members in set B since the 
percent of patronage refunds paid in cash can be different 
for each patron group. Similarly the deferment period for 
each member group can be different so (4.22a) must hold for 
all patron groups in set B. Since (4.22c) does not need to 
hold as a strict equality, (4.22a) also does not need to be 
a strict equality. Some patrons can conceivably have a 
deferment period equal to zero (100% patronage refund paid 
in cash) which is the only case where (4.24a) would be a 
strict equality. 
Equation (4.22a) can be interpreted that the 
decision-maker should set equal to or greater than zero the 
sura of: (a) the change in member profits induced by a 
change in membership caused by a change in from changes 
in total private sales revenue, a change in the present 
value of patronage dividends caused by a change in the 
amount distributed, dividends on stock, and total collective 
profits from a change in capital, (b) the change in the 
present value of net savings caused by a change in the 
present value factor, and (c) the variation in total 
collective profits of members from a change in capital which 
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was induced by a change in x^. This is written in equation 
form as: 
3V 3TCP 3N 3PVNS 3TCP 3K 
= Z + a + > 0 (4.32) 
3t m 3N 3t ^ 3t 3K 3t 
n m n n n 
Using Debt (D) as an instrument variable to maximize profits 
indicates that the cooperative decision-maker should employ 
debt to the point where the marginal profit of debt equals 
or exceeds the marginal cost of debt. This is seen by 
acknowledging that the first term in (4.23a) is the present 
value of the marginal interest cost of debt and the second 
term is the variation in total collective profits arising 
from a change in K caused by a change in D. In short-hand 
notation, (4.23a) can be rewritten as: 
3V 3PVNS 3TCP 3K 
>  0  (4 .33 )  
3d 3D 3K 3D 
The model allows for any type of stock and yields the 
Kuhn-Tucker conditions using stock prices (4.24a) and 
dividends paid on stock (4.25a) as instrument variables. 
Since the price of stock (value) will always be positive, 
(4.24a) can be written in strict equality form. It should 
be noted that the price of stock can be varied however it 
will typically be held constant to avoid the potential 
accounting problems. It should be realized that different 
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sized memberships may require varying the amounts of stock, 
which is not included in this model. The interpretation of 
(4.24a) shows that: the decision-maker should set stock 
prices to maximize profits by setting equal to zero the sum 
of: (a) the change in total collective profits caused by 
changing membership by changing the price of stock from 
changes in total private sales revenues, the change in 
present value of patronage dividends caused by changing the 
amount distributed and the level of stock dividends, (b) the 
variation in the present value of net savings caused by 
changing the stock price, and (c) the variation in total 
collective profits from a change in capital caused by a 
change in the price of the stock. This Kuhn-Tucker 
condition can be re-stated in shorthand notation as: 
3V 3rCP % 3PVNS 3TCP 3K 
= Z —— + + = 0 (4.34) 
BPS m 3N 3FS 3?S 3K 3PS 
m 
Equation (4,25a) can be written as: 
3V 3TCP 3N 3PVNS 3TCP 3K 
= Z — + + + SPic > 0 (4.35) 
31C m 3N 3IC 3lC 3K 3IC ^ 
n m n n n 
Since some dividend rates for certain stock types or members 
may be zero; (4.35) is still in the weak inequality form. 
The interpretation for the Kuhn-Tucker condition using the 
stock dividend rate as an instrument variable shows that to 
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maximize cooperative member profits, the decision-maker 
should set equal to or greater than zero the sum of: (a) 
the variation in total collective profits from changing 
membership via changing the dividend rate paid, (b) the 
variation in the present value of net savings by changing 
the dividend rate, (c) the variation in total collective 
profits from a change in K induced by a change in the 
dividend rate, and (d) the shadow price of the dividend rate 
paid. 
Allocating operating income, debt costs, and net 
savings is one method to differentially treat members. By 
using as an instrument the cooperative decision-maker can 
see how to make these allocations to maximize profits. If 
some net operating income, debt costs, or net savings is 
allocated to each member group, (4.27a) must be a strict 
inequality, that is, for all nsB, > 0. 
Another variable chat is seemingly available to the 
cooperative decision-maker is the amount of stock that must 
be held by various members (SH^). It would not be correct 
to utilize these as instrument variables in this study since 
the levels would remain constant once they are set. To 
change these periodically would cause enormous accounting 
and recordkeeping problems. Although they are not changed, 
members may realize different levels by movement between the 
different patron groups. 
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The remaining Kuhn-Tucker conditions (4.27), (A.28a), 
(4.28b), (4.28c), (4.29a), (4.29b), (4.29c), (4.30a), 
(4.30b), and (4.30c) represent the constraints on the 
financial model objective function. The condition (4.27) 
reconstructs the capital usage constraint of the cooperative 
that states the total capital employed is derived from the 
sale of stock, funds obtained from a revolving fund, and 
debt sources. The constraint that the proportion of 
patronage refunds paid in cash to each patron must be 
greater that 20% and less than 100% is given by (4.28a), 
4.28b), (4.28c), (4.29a), (4.29b), and (4.29c). The 
remaining conditions (4.30a), (4.30b), and (4.30c) restrict 
the level of stock dividend rates that the cooperative can 
pay on stock. Even though these Kuhn-Tucker conditions can 
be interpreted, it is highly unlikely that any cooperative 
decision-maker could possibly have enough information to 
follow them. Royer [52] and VanSickle [64] both concede 
that their models are complex to the point that practical 
use is questionable. The Kuhn-Tucker conditions here fall 
into this same pitfall since a second level of information 
is also needed. For example, the cooperative decision-maker 
must now derive prices for each member group rather than one 
overall price. As with these previous models, even though 
the Kuhn-Tucker conditions are complicated and require 
extensive amounts of information, they still provide 
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worthwhile information about the optimal actions of a profit 
maximizing cooperative decision-maker. The vast amount of 
information that must be known by the decision-maker is one 
major constraint in using this model. To look at the 
applicability of this general theoretical model, a 
simplified cooperative situation will be modelled in 
Chapter V. This simulation shows an application of the 
general model and at the same time tests the theoretical 
model. 
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CHAPTER V. APPLICATION OF THE THEORETICAL MODEL 
Previous chapters outlined the basis for a model 
allowing for differential member treatment, presented a 
general model, and derived the set of Kuhn-Tucker conditions 
that pertain to a cooperative decision-maker interested in 
maximizing profits. This work, similar to earlier studies, 
concluded that extensive information must be available to 
the decision-maker to fully utilize the proposed Kuhn-Tucker 
conditions. This chapter presents an application of the 
general model that can be used to test and analyze the model 
and Kuhn-Tucker conditions that were determined in Chapters 
III and IV. The financial submodel used in this application 
corresponds to the model presented on page 83. The model is 
solved in two stages (the financial model is solved after 
solving the production model). The application model also 
includes steps to make the model iterative with solutions to 
initial runs being used as feedback to successive runs. 
There are two reasons why the first theoretical model 
presented in Chapter III and the application model differ. 
First, a new procedure to solve the financial model was 
developed after the theoretical model was formulated. The 
Jones [30] and VanSickle and Ladd [66] articles outline a 
procedure that was not available when the initial 
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theoretical model was developed. The second reason relates 
to the computational advantage in solving the model with the 
two-step procedure. Although the application financial 
model is solved in two steps it can be solved much easier 
since it involves a set of equations with at most one 
non-linear equation. The theoretical financial model could 
be solved numerically however it would involve solving a set 
of non-linear equations. Even though the models would yield 
a different set of Kuhn-Tucker conditions, a priori it is 
impossible to say 'whether the results would be the same. 
The set of Kuhn-Tucker conditions is not explicitly derived 
in the application model. The remaining part of this 
chapter will provide a brief review of previous applications 
of cooperative models, objectives for this application, the 
formulation of a mathematical and computer model, and some 
conclusions arrived at with this model application. 
Royer [52] designed his short-run theoretical model to 
find the optimal production and pricing decisions but did 
not make any attempt to empirically test the model. 
Eversull [17] proceeded to make an empirical test of Royer's 
work by modelling a simplified cooperative having four 
activities that included sales of bag and bulk fertilizer to 
patrons and the purchase of corn and soybeans from the 
patrons. Royer's work specified individual patron and 
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non-patron supply and demand functions in functional form, 
whereas in Eversull's hypothetical grain cooperative model 
these were assumed linear with known parameters. Eversull's 
study allowed for interrelated supply and demand functions 
and the possibility of cooperative members patronizing other 
firms. The nature of the model necessitated a quadratic 
programming approach to account for supply and demand being 
quadratic in basis values (the model used basis values in 
lieu of prices). After specifying the member and non-member 
supply and demand functions, total cooperative member profit 
was maximized subject to capacity constraints using basis 
values as the instrument variables. This approach solved 
for the values of basis (prices) and production but did not 
provide the decision-maker with any insight on financial 
decisions (deferment period, cash patronage refund, debt, 
and qualified patronage refunds). 
VanSickle [64] proceeded with Royer's 
pricing-production model and developed a long-run financial 
model to accompany it. In addition to devising a financial 
model, VanSickle empirically estimated the price instrument 
variables for several commodities as represented by the 
structural equations of the pricing-production model. Using 
1979 data from Iowa cooperatives, the pricing functions for 
fertilizer, feed, corn, and soybeans were estimated. Of 
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particular interest to the model presented in Chapter III, 
it was found that both the percent of patronage refund paid 
in cash and the length of the deferment period were not 
statistically significant in determining the price of the 
commodity. This phenomenon is interesting since it suggests 
that s and T  are not influential in the pricing-production 
decisions. It is obvious however that s and T are very 
important to the financial concerns of the cooperative. 
VanSickle and Ladd [66] used the financial model of 
VanSickle to derive the optimal levels of qualified 
patronage refunds (QPR), dividend rates (i^), deferment 
period ('), percent cash patronage refund (s), and the 
amount of debt to employ (D). The procedure used involved 
maximizing profits via the solution of a set of non-linear 
equations and a simulation process. Since the VanSickle and 
Ladd work was aimed at refining a financial model, price and 
production levels were assumed exogenous and there was no 
feedback between the models. The VanSickle and Ladd work 
was scrutinized by Jones [30] who believed that their 
specification of the cooperative objective function was in 
error. Using the insight provided by Jones, VanSickle and 
Ladd [66] developed several alternative models, one of which 
was a two-stage synthesis of the two works. This two-stage 
synthesis involved recognizing the complementarity of x 
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and s. This complementarity relationship exists since the 
changes in one can be offset by changing the value of the 
other. The first step involves solving for the decision 
variables QPR, i^, D, and H (where H = T[1-S]). The second 
step utilizes the optimal values of H and QPR determined in 
the first step and solves for the optimal values of T and s. 
The procedure used in this two-stage procedure has a 
computational advantage over the other models in that it 
requires solving a set of simulataneous equations where at 
most one equation is non-linear, not the full set as in the 
other models. Recognizing this computational advantage, the 
application of the general model will use this procedure for 
determining the effects of cooperative member differential 
treatment. 
Procedure Used for the Specific Model 
The primary objective of this chapter is to set up and 
simulate an application of the general model proposed in 
Chapter III. The application will use the general model as 
a foundation and will be built using procedures employed in 
previous applications. The process of solving for the 
optimal levels of the decision variables is a four-step, 
iterative procedure. The basic procedure involves 
determining the pricing-production decisions using prices as 
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choice variables (Stage 1), solving the financial model in a 
two-step procedure as done by VanSickle and Ladd [66] using 
the solution price values from step one (Stages 2 and 3), 
and updating variables to solve for the following year's 
pricing-production model (Stage 4). 
Formulation of a Computer Simulation Model 
In setting up a mathematical model, special care needs 
to be taken in classifying variables and specifying the 
complexity of the cooperative enterprise to model. Since 
the model is solved in a four-step process, some variables 
will be endogenous (determined by the model) in one stage 
and exogenous (predetermined) in another. Prices and 
quantities are good examples of this phenomenon since they 
are endogenous in Stage I, the pricing-production model, and 
exogenous in Stage II, the first part of the financial 
model. Other variables which are of a similar nature are 
QPR, H, s, and ^. Table 5.1 provides a key for the 
variables that will be used in this chapter's simulation 
model and can be used to compare notation with the previous 
general model's notation. 
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TABLE 5.1. Application model key 
Variables 
QPR = level of qualified patronage refunds 
IC = dividend rate 
T  = deferment period 
s = percent cash patronage refund 
D = level of cooperative debt 
H = T(l-s) 
q = quantity demanded/supplied by member patron 
Q = quantity demanded/supplied by non-member patron 
p = price, without superscript represents the price 
the cooperative pays for inputs (fertilizer) and 
receives for outputs (corn) 
r = with subscripts this is the level of expected per 
unit patronage refund 
= without subscripts this represents the average 
cost of cooperative debt 
N = the number of patrons 
K = the level of capital used by the cooperative 
PS = the price of cooperative stock 
SH = the number of shares of stock held by a member 
Tp = the individual's income tax rate 
DS = the dividends paid on cooperative stock 
Subscripts 
CH = corn high volume (over 5000 bushels) 
CL = corn low volume (under 5000 bushels) 
FH = fertilizer high volume (over 400 units) 
FL = fertilizer low volume (under 400 units) 
S = field services (only one level) 
Superscripts 
c = cooperative 
o = other firms 
T = total firms (cooperative + other firms) 
Operators and coefficients 
L = logarithm of 
aij, bij = elasticity coefficients for members and 
non-members 
A consideration in the formulation of a specific 
simulation model is its complexity. The model should be 
complete enough to be realistic and usable, yet not too 
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cluttered and complex to be unmanageable. The general model 
in this paper allows each patron to be afforded a different 
value for prices, s, T, stock shares, stock dividends, and 
stock prices, rather than a single value that is typical 
with previous models. Realizing these concerns, the model 
in this chapter will include only two departments, a corn 
marketing department and a fertilizer supply department. 
The corn marketing department contains two activities, 
marketing corn for high volume (CH) patrons and low volume 
(CL) patrons. The supply department has three activities, 
supplying fertilizer to a group of high volume (FH) patrons 
and low volume (FL) patrons, along with the provision of a 
set of field services (S) to these fertilizer patrons. The 
first stage of the process is analogous to Eversull's work. 
That is, the cooperative pricing and production decisions 
are solved by maximizing profit subject to capacity 
constraints with specified linear functions for member 
supply, member demand, non-member supply, and non-member 
demand as given. The following notation is.used to specify 
these functions: (Lq^^, Lq^^) are the logarithms of the 
levels of corn marketed through the cooperative by a member 
in the high-corn-volume group and by a member in the 
low-corn-volume corn group; (Lq^^, Lq^^) are the logarithms 
of the levels of corn marketed through other firms by a 
member in the high-corn-volume group and a member in the 
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low-corn-volume group; [Lq^y, LqC^, Lq^} are the logarithms 
of the levels of fertilizer purchased from the cooperative 
by a high-fertilizer-volume member, a low-fertilizer-volume 
member, and a level of field services demanded from the 
cooperative by all members; (Lq^y, LqO^, Lq^) are the 
logarithms of the levels of fertilizer purchased from other 
firms by a high-fertilizer-volume member, a 
low-fertilizer-volume member, and a level of field services 
demanded from other firms by all members; are 
the logarithms of the levels of corn marketed through the 
cooperative by non-members in the high volume group and by 
non-members in the low volume group; LQ^^) are the 
logarithms of the levels of fertilizer demanded from the 
cooperative by non-members in a high volume fertilizer group 
and by non-members in a low volume group; (Lp^^, Lp^^, Lp^^, 
Lpp^, LPg} and (Lpg^, Lp°^, Lp°Q, Lp°^, Lp°} are the 
logarithms of the respective cooperative prices and other 
firm prices for CH, CL, FH, FL, and S. (Lr^^, Lr^^, Lrp^, 
Lrpy , Lr^) , LTQ^ , LTp,^, LTp,^ , LT^} and (LSQ^, LS^J , 
Lspy, Lsp^, Lsg) are respectively the logarithms of the 
expected per unit patronage refund, the length of the 
deferment period, and the percent patronage refund paid in 
cash for CH, CL, FH, FL, and S. These supply and demand 
functions are specified for all products for each patron and 
are given as follows. 
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Individual Member Supply Functions (to cooperative): 
"  ^ll^PCH "  ^ 12^PCH ^IS^'^CH "  ^14^'^CH 
+ (5.1) 
"  ^21^PCL ~  ^ 22^PCL ^23^^CL "  ^24^^CL 
+ a^S^^CL (5.2) 
Individual Member Supply Functions (to other firms): 
" "  ^31^PCH •*• ^ 32^PCH " ^34'"^CH 
^35^®CH (5.3) 
L^CL " "  ^41^PCL "*• ® 42^PCL "  ^43^^CL ®44^^CL 
"  ^45^^CL (5.4) 
Individual Member Demand Functions (from cooperative): 
LqpH = -  ^ 51^PFH ^52^PFH ^53^^FH ~  ^ 54^^FH "^^SS^^FH 
- a^^Lpg + a^yLpO (5.5) 
LSpL " ~ s^l^PpL ^62^PFL ^ "  ^64^^FL "^^ÔS^'^FL 
~ ®66^PS a^yLpO (5.6) 
Lqg = - ag^Lpg + ag2Lpg + ag^Lrg - Sg^b'-g + ag^usg 
(5.7) 
Individual Member Demand Functions (from other firms): 
LqpH ^  ^ 71^PFH ~  ^ 72^PFH "  ^73^^FH ®74^^ FH ~ ^75'"'^FH 
+ a^gLpC - a^yLpO (5.8) 
L^FL s^l^PpL "  ^82^^FL ~  ^ SS^'^FL ^84^^ FL "  ^85^'^FL 
••• ^ 86^Ps ~ ®87^PS (5.9) 
^'^S "  ^lO.l^^S ~ ®10.2^PS "  ^10.3^^S •*• ® 10.4^^S 
- *10.51=% (5.10) 
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Individual Non-member Supply Functions (to cooperative): 
^II^PCH ~ ^IB^^CH "  ^14^'cH 
•*• ( 5.11) 
"  ^21^PCL ~  ^ 22'"PCL *^23^^01 ~ ^24^^CL 
"*• ^25^'^CL (5.12) 
Individual Non-member Demand Functions (from cooperative): 
LQpH = - bgiLpC^ + b22LPpH + bg^LrpQ -
+ b^gLp^ - bgyLp^ (5.13) 
L^FL " "  ^41^PFL ^42^PFL ^\3^^FL "  ^44^'^FL •'"^45^'^FL 
+ ^6^PS -  ^ 47^PS (5.14) 
Assuming that all producers within each group are 
homogeneous, the total quantity of product supplied 
(demanded) by the n-th group is found by summing across the 
individual supply (demand) functions or by multiplying by N^ 
(the number of patrons in that group). The number of 
producers with member patronage to the cooperative, number 
of members with patronage to other firms, and total number 
of producers are represented by the following sets 
^CL' ^FH' ^FL' ^CL' ^FH' ^FL ' ^ ^^CH' '^CL' 
N^H» ^ fL' "s^* (all i,j) are predetermined 
parameters of the model which should vary among producer 
groups since the members are assumed to have different 
business volumes. If the patrons were homogeneous, the 
parameters for LqC^ and LqC^, LqC^ and LqC^, LqO^ and LqO^, 
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and LqC^, LQC^ and LQC^, LQC^ and LQC^ would be the 
same. The supply and demand functions are in log-linear 
form which allows the a^^ and b^^ to be interpreted as 
supply and demand elasticities. 
The a^^, for i = 1 to 10, are the own price 
elasticities for members. For example, a^^ is the percent 
change in the quantity of corn marketed through the 
cooperative by high volume members caused by a one percent 
change in the cooperative's respective corn price for those 
members. The a^g» ^13» ®i4' ®i5 i = 1 to 10 are 
respectively the elasticities of patron supply or demand 
with respect to the competitor's price, expected per unit 
patronage refunds, length of deferment, and the percent 
patronage refund paid in cash. The and a^y are cross 
price elasticities with respect to the level of cooperative 
and competitor field services provided. The interpretation 
of (ail i,j), own price elasticities for non-members, is 
analogous to the aUj's. The supply and demand functions are 
set up in this manner to determine the effects of relative 
or percentage changes in the variables r, T, and s rather 
than absolute changes. In obtaining the values for these 
parameters, the relevant questions to be answered are of the 
following form: if a given decision variable increases 
(decreases) X percent, what would the percentage change in 
125 
supply (demand) be? For example, to arrive at a value for 
a^^ the relevant question is; If increases 1%, what 
percentage change in would result? Values for the 
parameters a^^. and b^^j (all i,j) for this type of 
cooperative were determined after personal and telephone 
interviews with ten marketing and supply cooperative 
managers in Northeast Iowa and Southwest Wisconsin. The 
responses obtained from these interviews varied from 
cooperative to cooperative. The values used in the 
application base model are the averages of these responses 
and are presented in later in Table 5.2. After specifying 
the supply and demand function parameters, the values for 
the fully exogenous variables (p^ y ,  P^ l» PpH' PpL' ^} 
and initial values for the short-run exogenous variables 
(levels of per-unit patronage refunds, lengths of deferment 
periods, and producer numbers) the first stage of the model 
can be solved. Stage I can now be completed by maximizing 
total member profits subject to the capacity constraints 
using cooperative prices as the decision variables. Once 
the optimal pricing (production) decisions are made, the net 
savings generated for each product can be determined. It 
should be noted that the variables representing expected 
patronage refunds, deferment period, percent patronage 
refund paid in cash, and membership breakdown are fixed 
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(exogenous) in Stage I yet are endogenous in latter stages. 
Even though the parameters a^^ (all i,j), (all i,j), 
other firm prices, capital needs (K), and capacity limits 
are fixed through all stages, they can be altered to 
consider various cooperative circumstances. This 
mathematical model for this first stage is represented by 
equations (5.15) through (5.18). 
The notation for the first stage of the model is as 
follows. is the after-tax profits of all cooperative 
members; (Tp^y, Tp^^, Tpp^, Tpp^, Tpg) are the respective 
marginal tax rates for each type of member; (pgy, Ppg» 
ppL> Pg) are the cooperative prices for patrons; {q^y, 
qpH> IpL' Qg) are the amounts of business patronage by 
cooperative producers; {p°jj» P°l» PpH' PpL' ^ S  ^ are the 
prices of the various commodities for other firms; {q°y, 
q^L» ^FL ' are the amounts of member business 
patronage with other firms; (s^y, Sp^, Sp^, Sg} are the 
respective percent of patronage refunds paid in cash; (d^y, 
dçy, dpQ, dp^, dg) are the appropriate discount rates for 
each member group type; -p^, -p^, Xg) are the 
lengths of the deferment period for each group; {p^^, PQ^) 
are the prices the cooperative receives from outside buyers 
for corn; (pp^, Pp^, Pg} are the average total costs 
incurred by the cooperative to supply these goods and 
127 
services; IC^^, ICp^, ICp^, ICg) are the dividend 
rates paid on stock held by each group; (PScH' ^^CL' ^^FH' 
PScT , PSc) are the prices per share of stock for each patron 
r L b 
group; SH^^, SHp^, SHp^, SHg} are the levels of stock 
held by each member in a group; and Iq^» Qp» qg) are the 
respective capacity limits for the cooperative for corn, 
fertilizer and field services. 
Maximize 
-(I-tpfr) {N^H^PFH^FH^'^^FH^PFH^FH^ } 
-(1-TPFL) {N^L^Pfl*^FL^"''^FL^PFL'^FL^ ) 
-(l_Tpg){NC(pCqC)+HO(pOqO)) 
(I-Scr) 
+ - TPCH + d )TCH "'"CH-W 
Ln 
[^CH ^CH ~ 
+[SCL - TPCL +(i+d^^)^^L ]((PCL-PCL) 
iT 
[^CL ^CL ^^CL~^CL ^'"CL 
(I-Sfr) 
+[SFH TPpH +,,, sTpu ]((PFH"PFH) 
I py / 
[NpH ^FH ••• (^FH'^FH'^FH) ^FH^ "  ^"^FH ^^FH ^^FH^ 
^t^FL - TPFL ^(i^dpj'^FL 
[NpL ^FL "•" ^^FL~^FL~^FL^ ^FL^ ~ ^'"FL ^^FL ^^FL^ 
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( l-Sq ) 
+[Se - Tpn + ]{(Po-Pc) 
^  ^  ( 1 + d g )  S  ^  ^  
[NC ,= + (NT-N°-NC) QÇ] . IC3 PSJ SHJ) 
(5.15) 
such that 
^CH (^CH "  ^CH " ^CH 
•*• ^CL ~  ^ CL " "^CL (5.16) 
^FH ^FH •*" ^^FH ~  ^ FH "  ^FH^ ^FH 
••• ^FL ^FL "*• (^FL ~  ^ FL "  ^FL^ ^FL ^  ^ F (5.17) 
Ng qC + (NT _ Ng - Ng) Qg < (5.18) 
During this first stage the volume of business done 
during a fiscal year is determined by the optimizing values 
of the choice variables. These optimizing values are the 
decisions made at the beginning of the fiscal year and 
T 
affect the values of number of total producers (N ), the 
number of exclusive cooperative patrons (N^), and number of 
members who patronize other firms completely (N°) for that 
year. The model allows producers to patronize both the 
cooperative and other firms. Even though a member may 
patronize other firms they will be treated similar to other 
members with like patronage levels. At this point the first 
stage is complete and the next step involves the financial 
aspects of the model. The second stage in this simulation 
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process involves determining the optimal values for the 
decision variables of the financial model. This stage uses 
the solution values for prices and quantities obtained from 
Stage I as exogenous variables and considers qualified 
patronage refunds (QPR), Debt (D), and H (where H is defined 
as T[1-S]) as financial choice variables. The variable H, a 
composite measure of x and s, is endogenously determined in 
Stage II and treated as exogenous in Stage III. At the end 
of a fiscal year, the cooperative determines its net savings 
for that year. The net savings must be allocated with this 
allocation affecting the cooperative's financial structure 
and the present value of member's income. The financial 
structure is also affected by the other decisions made at 
this time. The objective function for Stage II maximizes 
profits of all members. The mathematical model for Stage II 
is represented by equations (5.19) through (5.26). 
Maximize 
+ (I-tpcl) {Ncl^PCL^CL^'^^CL^PCL'^CL^ } 
-(i-Tppn) ) 
-(1-Tpfl) {NFL^PFL'^FL^'^^FL^PFL^FL^ } 
-(l-Tpg)(Ng(pgqg)+N°(p°q°)) 
+Nch( 1-TPCH)QPKCH 
-dcH(l-TPCH)[%CH HcH QP^CH +  ^ ScH SHcH^ 
+ N ^ L ( 1 - T P c l ) Q P ^ C L  
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+NCH(1-TPFH)QPRFH ••• ^^FH ^^FH 
-dFHd-TpFH^tN^H Hp^ QPRpH +  ^ ^FH ^^FH^ 
+NPL(1-Tpfl)QPRFL •*• (I'^^FL^^^FL ^^FL ^^FL 
-dFiCl-TpFL) [N|L Hp^ ^^FL ^^FL^ 
+N^Xl-Tpg)QPRg + (l-Tpg)ICg PSg SHg 
-dg(l-Tpg)[NC Hg QPRg + PSg SHg] 
(5 • 19) 
such that 
HsQPRs - ~ ^^CL^^CL ~  ^ ^FH^^FH 
- PSp^SHpL - PSgSHg - D (5.20) 
° " (PCH " •*" (PCL ~ PCL^^^CL '"' ^CL^ 
"(PpH - PpH^^SpH + Qpfl) - (PpL " PpL^^^FL '"' ^FL^ 
-(Pg - pS)(qg + Q#) - QP*CH - QP*CL -QP*FH - QP*FL 
QPRs - IC^^PS^ySH^y -  ^ ^CL^^CL^^CL "^"^FH^^FH^^FH 
-  ^ ^ fL^^FL^"FL " ICgPSgSHg - rD ^ 
IC^H < 0.08 (5.22) 
IC^L < 0.08 (5.23) 
ICpH < 0.08 (5.24) 
ICpL < 0.08 (5.25) 
ICg < 0.08 (5.26) 
w h e r e  ( ,  ^ F H ' ^ F L '  a r e  n u m b e r s  o f  c o o p e r a t i v e  
members of a given group who patronize the cooperative in 
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the respective departments, Hp^, Hp^, Hg) are 
intermediate variables defined as Tj(l-Sj) for all "j" 
departments, K is the amount of capital needed to operate 
the cooperative, D is the amount of debt employed by the 
cooperative, and r is the average cost of cooperative debt 
sources. 
The third stage involves solving for specific values of 
T and s using the maximization of the present value of 
qualified patronage refunds as the objective function. The 
previously determined values of QPR and H are used to 
determine the optimal values of s and x. At the completion 
of Stage III, all of the pricing-production and financial 
decision variables are determined. Equations (5.27) through 
(5.37) represent the mathematical model for Stage III. 
Maximize 
L3 - [sgy \Xru^^^^CH 
CH" 
(l-Sg) 




^CH " ( 5 . 2 8 )  
^CL " ( 5 . 2 9 )  
^FH " ( 5 . 3 0 )  
^FL " "^FL^^'^FL^ ( 5 . 3 1 )  
^S = ( 5 . 3 2 )  
0 . 2 ^  <  1 . 0  ( 5 . 3 3 )  
0.2 < S(.^  < 1 . 0  ( 5 . 3 4 )  
0.2 < Spy < 1 . 0  (5.35) 
0.2 j< Sp^ < 1.0 ( 5 . 3 6 )  
0.2 < Sg < 1.0 (5.37) 
Stage IV involves updating several variables to enable 
successive runs of the four stage process. This stage 
allows several iterations of the model to be made giving it 
a time dimension. The cooperative then fully allocates net 
savings. In addition, decisions affecting the next fiscal 
year's prices must be made. This brings us back to Stage I 
for the upcoming year. The exogenous variables in Stage I 
can be updated based on the values of decision variables in 
the latter stages. The list of updated variables include 
the expected per unit patronage refund (the actual value 
becomes the expected value for successive runs) and the 
producer number breakdown. This update takes place after 
the short-run optimization of the pricing-production model 
but before the run of the next iteration. The total number 
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of producers in each class (N^^, Np^, Ng) can be 
updated as well as the breakdown in patronage location 
(cooperative or other) and non-member patronage level. 
Assuming that patronage level (of members and non-members) 
is a function of financial policies, the change in patronage 
can be estimated for the next run. The number of patrons in 
a group is assumed to be positively related to the price 
paid, the expected per-unit cash refund and the percent of 
cash patronage refund while negatively related to the length 
of the deferment period. The general patron number 
elasticities that are relevant to this simulation model 
(that have to be specified) are given in Table 5.2. 
TABLE 5.2. General patron number elasticities used in 
the base model in this study 







































The elasticities of Table 5.2 are used to change the 
level of cooperative member patronage. For example, if 
^CH s equal to 0.90, this means that for a 10% change in 
Sçy, there would be a 9% change in the level of For 
simplicity, this work assumes that patron number 
elasticities for a given group of patrons are constant over 
all iterations of the model. In reality, these elasticities 
will most likely vary as extreme levels of the instrument 
variables are reached. 
After making any desired changes in parameters and/or 
exogenous variables, the model can be run again by returning 
to Stage I and proceeding through the successive stages. A 
brief outline and flow diagram clarify this simulation 








obtain values of parameters for the supply and 
demand functions (aUj and b^^ (all i,j)} 
obtain values of the exogenous variables (K and the 
vector of p j 
specify initial values for the vectors of variables 
exogenous in the production-pricing model { r, T, 
s, N^, N°, NC) 
maximize total cooperative profits using the vector 
of cooperative prices as choice variables 
determine values for the vectors (NS, QPR, DS} 
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Stage II. 
a) use the pricing and production levels as determined 
in Stage I as exogenous variables. 
b) maximize members' total after-tax net profits using 
QPR, D, and H as the cooperative's choice 
variables. 
Stage III. 
a) use the endogenously determined values of QPR, D 
and H from Stage II as exogenous variables 
b) maximize the discounted present value of patronage 
refunds using s and x as the cooperative's choice 
variables 
Stage IV 
a) using the endogenously determined variables from 
the previous stages calculate the actual per-unit 
patronage refunds 
b) compare values of s and t that are exogenous in 
Stage I to those endogenously determined in 
Stage III and decide if a change in membership is 
necessary (based on patron number elasticities) 
c) make adjustments to patronage levels if necessary 
d) change values of parameters and/or exogenous 
variables if desired 
e) proceed to Stage I to re-run the model 
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Determine the actual per-unit patronage refund 






refund values and 
membership numbers 
Maximize cooperative profits via a non-linear 
optimization routine using cooperative prices as 
choice variables. 
Solve (determine) for the values of other response 
variables (profits for each group and net 
savings) and the allocation of net savings. 
Select values for the short-run exogenous variables 
(deferment period lengths, percent cash patronage 
refund) and initial values for membership numbers, 
and expected per-unit patronage refunds. 
Maximize cooperative member's profits using 
values of qualified patronage refunds, level of 
cooperative debt, and H (= ?[l-s]) as choice 
variables. 
Maximize the discounted present value of 
patronage refunds using the percent of patronage 
and deferment period length reruns paid in cash 
as choice variables. 
Determine the appropriate 
1) set of producer behavioral functions 
2) set of parameters and exogenous variables 
(other firm prices and a. b. . a i,j). 
Figure 5.1. Flow chart of the cooperative decision process 
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Formulation of the Computer Model 
The computer model follows the stages set forth for the 
mathematical formulation and solves for the optimal level of 
the decision variables. The computer modelling was done 
using a non-linear optimization program called GINO/PC. 
This software package uses a reduced gradient algorithm to 
solve the non-linear set of equations. This optimization 
package was chosen over other programs since the model could 
be solved on a microcomputer. This enables the model to be 
solved using a personal computer that many cooperative 
managers have access to. Equipped with the appropriate 
software and personal computer, the decision-maker can 
individualize the program to arrive at specific 
recommendations for a specific cooperative. A drawback with 
the GINO/PC program is that it can only handle 30 equations 
and 50 variables at one time. With just five product groups 
the full complement of equations is used in Stage I. Other 
stages also bump into this constraint of 30 equations. To 
deal with these limitations, each stage is solved in a 
single model with the results physically entered into the 
next stage. This is a burdensome process yet is worth the 
cost since it allows the flexibility of use by cooperative 
decision-makers at their location and convenience. 
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Application Results 
In analyzing the results from the various computer 
runs, the parameters used for the different cooperative 
scenarios play an important role. The nature of the 
cooperative and some general operating guidelines are 
determined in steps a, b, and c of Stage I (as described 
above). Through simulation, the possible impacts of 
differential treatment can be estimated. First a base model 
with equal member treatment is constructed, then four sets 
of differential treatment policies are simulated. The first 
two sets involve changing prices and using varying 
membership elasticities. The third set involves changing 
the levels of s and using four levels of membership 
elasticities. The last set allows prices, s, and f to vary. 
Base model 
The first ncdsl constructed is one in which all members 
are treated equally. That is, high volume (HV) patrons 
receive the exact same treatment (with respect to prices, 
percent cash patronage refund, and deferment period) as low 
volume (LV) patrons. In this situation, the cooperative 
operations and membership are stable (relatively constant 
variable values) since the actual and expected per-unit 
patronage refunds, deferment periods, and percentage of 
patronage refund paid in cash are equal. The model 
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stabilizes after three iterations. Column 1 of Table 5.3 
presents the average results of the base model with no 
differential treatment. The terms in the table are not 
superscripted or subscripted however the meanings are the 
same as discussed earlier. 
With the base model, the decision-maker sets the choice 
variables at the same values for all patrons. Only one corn 
price and one fertilizer price exists for all patrons. The 
deferment period and the percent patronage refund paid in 
cash are also the same for all patrons. Of the 200 corn 
producers, 100 patronize the cooperative exclusively and 100 
patronize other firms exclusively. Similarly, half of the 
fertilizer buyers patronize the cooperative and half do 
business with other firms. It is further noted that for 
both the cooperative and other firms, 75 out of 100 patrons 
for both commodities are classified as low volume patrons. 
Maximizing the total member: profits with this set of 
decisions yields a profit of $35,340. To be meaningful this 
level must be compared with profit levels from other 
simulations. This application assumes that the total number 
of producers is 200. When membership numbers change this 
base value must be considered. A drop in membership of 10 
may seem small however it represents 5% of the cooperative's 
patrons. 
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Differential treatment models 
Patrons can be treated differentially through the 
prices paid/received and/or through T or s which are used in 
determining the net discounted present value of patronage 
refunds. As discussed in Chapter II, the profitability to 
the cooperative of an individual patron's business can vary. 
For example, the cooperative may be able to offer a higher 
price to HV corn patrons since they market larger quantities 
than LV corn patrons. Allowing the cooperative to offer 
different prices for the same product may be justified if 
and only if a cost differential exists. By considering HV 
and LV patronage of corn and fertilizer as separate 
products, effectively the product line has doubled while the 
same physical product line remains the same. The product 
line now consists of HV corn, LV corn, HV fertilizer, LV 
fertilizer, and field services. Even though there is only 
one physical corn product, there are still two product lines 
that can each operate independently from each other. Each 
line can have different prices, deferment periods, and 
percentage cash patronage refunds. The decision-maker may 
have to differentially treat the HV and LV patrons to 
maintain the cooperative membership. By offering different 
prices, deferment periods, and/or percent cash patronage 
refunds, the cooperative membership can be affected. 
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Different prices The first set of differential 
treatment simulation involves offering different prices to 
high volume and low-volume corn patrons, PCCH = $2.50 and 
PCCL = $2.40. This cooperative scenario leads to a 
situation that changes membership numbers. Model #1 assumes 
membership responses to prices are inelastic, that is 
, 




. Model #2 uses unitary 
responses, 
^CH.p = ^ CL, p 
1.0. Model #3 assumes 




, both represent elastic 
responses. The second set of models involve changing prices 
by $0.10. Models #4 , #5, and #6 use the same membership 
elasticities as Models #1, #2, and #3 respectively. The 
results of these changes in price to corn patrons are given 
in last six ; columns of Table 5.3. 
Table 5.3. Results for the base model and differential 
treatment with prices 
Bdse Model Model Medal Model Model Model 
Model #1 #2 #3 #4 #5 #6 
TCH 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 
TCL 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 
sCH .3 .3 .3 .3 .3 .3 .3 
sCL .3 .3 .3 .3 .3 .3 .3 
PCCH 2.45 2.50 2.50 2.50 2.55 2.55 2.55 
PCCL 2.45 2.40 2.40 2.40 2.35 2.35 2.35 
NCCH 25 25 26 26 26 26 27 
NCCL 75 74 73 72 73 72 69 
NOCH 25 25 24 24 24 24 23 
NOCL 75 76 77 78 77 78 81 
TTC H $17670 $17761 $18472 $18472 $18567 $18567 $19281 
TTCL $17670 $17343 $17109 $16875 $17020 $16787 $16087 
n $35340 $35104 $35581 $35347 $35587 $35354 $35368 
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These pricing schemes are used to encourage additional 
HV corn cooperative patronage. The levels of cooperative 
patronage for LV corn decline with respect to the base 
model. It should be noted that the magnitude of the price 
changes for corn between the different scenarios greatly 
influences the changes in membership. In the base situation 
only one price is paid for corn (PCCH = PCCL = $2.45) 
whereas the differential treatment model has PCCH = $2.50 
($2.55) and PCCL = $2.40 ($2.35) where PCCH and PCCL are 
respectively the prices for corn sold to the cooperative by 
HV and LV patrons respectively. These new price values are 
not the profit maximizing levels. These price changes are 
exogenously determined. The price changes were set to allow 
the revenue gained by one group be equal to that lost by the 
other. The price per bushel gained by the HV patrons equals 
the price per bushel lost by LV patrons. Figure 5.2. shows 
the distribution of profit between these two types of 
patrons. 
In the first six models the profits of the HV patron 
increase whereas those of the LV patrons decrease. The 
total profit of the cooperative may increase or decrease. 
In these situations the cooperative decision-maker may have 
a difficult time justifying this type of differential 
treatment to the LV patrons. If the cooperative can receive 
a higher price for the corn that it sells to outside 
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S 
• / ' Lv profits HV profits 
Figure 5.2. Profit levels for the base model and 
differential treatment with prices 
buyers, both HV and LV patrons could benefit. Model #7 
looks at this scenario where economies of scale are realized 
by the cooperative since it has a larger total business 
volume. This model is the same as Model #6 except the 
cooperative now has an additional margin of $0.05 per bushel 
to distribute to all patrons. Model #7 illustrates that by 
differentially treating members, the resulting increased 
margins could make both LV and HV patrons better off 
compared to a model when the margins remain constant 
(Model #6). 
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Even though an increase in HV patronage was realized, 
by definition of the membership adjustment function in Stage 
III, the total cooperative membership could fall if some 
members are dissatisfied with their levels of patronage 
refunds paid in cash and their deferment period. This 
brings up a concern of how to define the membership 
adjustment function since it does not allow for any 
deviation in actual and expected levels of the adjustment 
variables without changing member numbers. In actuality 
there may exist tradeoffs between various levels of prices, 
percent patronage refunds paid in cash, deferment periods, 
and the per-unit patronage refunds; however, it is beyond 
the scope of this research to develop a membership function 
with these interaction terms. This model has distinct 
patron response functions with each variable operating 
independently; in reality they may be interrelated. A 
method that can be used by the cooperative to reduce the 
number of LV patrons who might discontinue doing business 
with the cooperative as determined from the previous 
scenario would be to educate members so they perceive the 
benefits to them of the pricing program. They should 
realize that the cooperative is trying to maintain the HV 
patrons which in turn may benefit the LV patrons. The 
procedure used in the model assumes the patron's expected 
level of these variables are the previous year's (previous 
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run's) value. This implies that the cooperative 
decision-maker is able to change the levels of , s^, and 
r^^ each year, however in reality these are relatively 
constant with only small changes each year. Although the 
levels of s^, and r^^ are changed for the different 
groups of patrons, within each group the levels are 
invariant. By offering various levels of ? , s , and r. to 
° n n in 
the different patrons, in effect the discount factor for the 
present value of patronage refunds is altered for each 
group. The discount factor s^^Tp^-[l-s^]/[l+d^] ^ is 
already different for each group if it is assumed that 
marginal income tax rates (Tp^) and discount rates (d^) vary 
for each group. By the nature of the supply and demand 
functions for the members and non-members, changing the 
levels of t g and r. affects both the quantities 
n n in * 
marketed and the membership adjustment function. 
After differential treatment is incorporated into the 
model by offering different prices, the number of HV patrons 
increase while the number of LV patrons decrease slightly. 
The exit and entrance of the HV and LV patrons and/or 
potential patrons is determined by membership adjustment 
functions specified in Table 5.2. To entice more HV 
patronage and to slow the exit of LV patrons, other models 
allowing for differential treatment can be devised. 
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Different T and s As noted in VanSickle and Ladd [66], 
the change in levels of s^ and can be adjusted to cancel 
the effect of each other. This creates an interesting 
situation for the cooperative decision-maker when the actual 
values of s^ and are determined. Changing the levels of 
and/or s^ will affect the model results through both the 
individual producer and the cooperative. The individual 
producer is affected directly by the change in the 
discounted value of patronage refunds. The cooperative will 
be affected directly through the change in the status of the 
revolving fund and indirectly via changes in membership and 
quantities marketed through the cooperative. In determining 
the values of and s^, the cooperative must generate a 
certain amount of financing through the revolving fund but 
may not have a preference for specific levels of these 
variables. The individual producer may have likes and 
dislikes for high or low values of T and s . These 
n n 
preferences are given to the cooperative decision-maker as 
elasticities through the coefficients of the log-linear 
supply and demand functions of members and non-members. 
Since each cooperative will have memberships with varying 
loyalties and preferences, the coefficients for the supply 
and demand functions will be different for each. For 
illustrative purposes, four scenarios were hypothesized, 
^CH,s " ^CH,t =0-6' ^CH,s = ^CH,t = 1'°, ?cH,s = 
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and ^ = 1.0, and ^ = 3.0 and ^ = 1.0. Models #8 
to #11 respectively use these elasticities. Model #12 
assumes economies of scale, that is, the cooperative has 
$0.05 per bushel more to return to the members. This model 
assumes that it is paid immediately in the form of higher 
prices, PCCH = PCCL = $2.50. These models assume a 20% 
increase in sCH and a 40% increase in xCH. The results of 
these models are given in Table 5.4. 
Table 5.4. Results for the base model and differential 
treatment with T and s 
Base Model Model Model Model Model Model 
Model #7 #8 #9 #10 #11 #12 
TCH 5 5 6 6 6 6 6 
TCL 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 
sCH .3 .3 .42 .42 .42 .42 .42 
sCL .3 .3 .3 .3 .3 .3 .3 
PCCH 2.45 2.55 2.45 2.45 2.45 2.45 2.50 
PCCL 2.45 2.35 2.45 2.45 2.45 2.45 2.50 
NCCH 25 26 23 20 25 30 30 
NCCL 75 72 75 75 75 75 75 
NOCH 25 24 27 30 26 20 20 
NOCL /5 78 75 75 /5 /5 /5 
TTCH $17670 $18831 $16286 $14146 $17683 $21220 $21634 
nCL $17670 $17030 $17670 $17670 $17670 $17670 $18014 
n $35340 $35861 $33938 $31816 $35353 $38890 $39648 
These results show that cooperative member profits can 
be influenced by changing the levels of and s^ without 
adversely affecting the financial situation of the 
cooperative. Only in the case where ^ is more than 
twice Ççjj ^ are HV patrons profits increased. At this point 
the gains realized by offering a 20% increase in sCH 
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outweigh the loss caused by increasing 40%. Both x and 
s must be changed to maintain the level of H. The 
cooperative decision-maker must consider the relative 
elasticities when contemplating a differential treatment 
program using s and . Model #12 shows that both the profit 
levels of the HV and LV patrons could be increased when 
economies of scale are realized. This again illustrates how 
LV patrons can benefit by allowing the cooperative 
decision-maker to use differential treatment. Figure 5.3. 
shows the profit levels of each group for Models #7 to #12. 
s  1 
771 K/y/'J 
LV profits HV profits 
Figure 5.3. Profit levels for the base model and 
differential treatment with T and s 
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In Models #8 to #12 the patrons are less responsive to 
changes in the deferment period as compared to the percent 
patronage refund paid in cash. It is advantageous for the 
cooperative to increase the deferment period and increase 
the level of patronage refunds paid in cash. The gains 
realized by the increase in s^ outweigh the loss from 
increasing . The levels of cooperative membership and 
patronage increase which lead to higher cooperative member 
profits. As the relative difference in elasticities 
(responsiveness) become greater, the potential for larger 
gains increases. When the relative elasticities are very 
close or equal, little if any potential gains exist through 
altering the levels of and s^. Allowing the five 
different products in the model to have varying relative 
elasticities would result in each having their own set of 
financial policy values. When the cooperative utilizes more 
product lines each having independent levels of and s^, 
the potential for a higher level of member profit increases. 
As the elasticities with respect to deferment period and 
percent patronage refund paid in cash become more uneven the 
opportunity for increased member profits also increase. The 
profit maximizing levels of ^ and are dependent on the 
relative elasticities and are given by a general rule 
involving the changes in patronage (quantity per patron) and 
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the membership (number of patrons) function. The change in 
profits caused by changes in membership and quantities 
marketed/supplied as a result of changes in and should 
be equated. 
Different T, g, and prices The last set of models 
actually combines the previous trials. Prices, s, and T are 
all simultaneously altered. Models #13 to #15 are the same 
as Models #4 to #6 with the changes of Model #11 added. The 
results of these models are presented in Table 5.5. and 
Figure 5.4. 
Table 5.5. Results for the base model and differential 
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Figure 5.4. Profit levels for differential treatment 
with prices, T and s 
In Models #13 to #15 the level of profits are lower 
than those in Models #4 to #6 where the levels of and s 
are equal for all patrons. Again, as the membership 
elasticities become more elastic, LV patron's profits 
decline. The profits for HV patrons on the other hand 
increase and are larger than without the changes in sCH and 
TCH. These models illustrate that the cooperative 
decision-maker has many factors to consider when 
differentially treating members. The membership 
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elasticities play a crucial role in determining the level of 
profits for the different patron groups. 
Other potential models 
All of the models assume that maximization of members' 
profit is the primary objective although several other goals 
could be considered. One such goal would be obtaining and 
maintaining a given level of membership and/or patronage 
(member and non-member) in the cooperative. The values of 
T and s could be set to achieve this goal in all the 
n n ° 
product lines or just in certain producer groups. The 
desire to change profit and member levels for specific 
product lines can be accomplished by both direct and 
indirect means. For example, to increase the number of HV 
fertilizer patrons, favorable levels of x and s could be 
n n 
afforded this group of producers for the direct product, 
fertilizer, and indirectly through field services which can 
influence the quantity of fertilizer demanded. The field 
service product, as set up in the model, could act as a 
loss-leader. That is, it could be provided with the primary 
purpose of attracting potential members into the fertilizer 
product lines. By offering the field service at a low cost, 
potential patrons may be enticed to patronize the 
cooperative. The success of increasing patronage in the 
fertilizer product lines by indirectly manipulating x^ and 
s^ of the loss-leader product is determined by the 
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complementarity of products and the allowable level of loss 
for this product line. Although the use of tho loss-leader 
product to influence patronage of other products may not be 
as effective as using direct methods, it may turn out to be 
the most feasible instrument and should be considered. 
The predominant conclusion resulting from the various 
cooperative scenarios run through the model is that the 
levels of and s^ for each product line can be used to 
favorably affect the operations of the cooperative. The 
magnitude of the effects is determined by the specification 
of the supply and demand function parameters. By allowing 
more product lines to offer independent levels of , s^ and 
prices, the potential for gain increases. These results 
suggest that the cooperative decision-maker should determine 
the various types of patrons groups in the cooperative and 
utilize any patron specific characteristics to attempt the 
intricate task of maximizing the profits of these members. 
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CHAPTER VI. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
Summary 
The success or failure of any business organization 
depends on its ability to adapt to the changing environment 
in which it operates. One predicament that cooperatives are 
increasingly becoming aware of is the difficulty of serving 
a vastly diverse membership. Cooperative members are 
becoming increasingly heterogeneous. This creates a variety 
of problems for the cooperative decision-maker including, 
most notably, disgruntled patrons who perceive that they are 
being treated "inequitably" by the cooperative business. 
The heterogeneity of cooperative members can be seen by 
looking at the many different sizes, financial situations, 
and ages of the patrons. It is important to realize that 
not all of these patron differences can or should be used to 
differentially treat members. If the heterogeneity of 
members creates a difference in the cost of servicing the 
patrons, differential treatment could be used. A 
heterogeneous membership could cause operational problems 
for the cooperative such as retaining patronage of members 
with high "quality of value of business". This research 
suggests that a system of differential treatment of 
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members may provide the decision-maker with a tool to 
minimize these problems. 
Although the cooperative membership can be categorized 
into many different groups, not all classifications can 
and/or should be used as a basis for differential treatment. 
The key to which classification systems can legally be used 
for differentially treating members depends on the existence 
of a definite cost difference between the groups. The 
number of different groups within the cooperative can range 
from one (no differentiation) to M, the total number of 
patrons. The general model presented in Chapter III allows 
for both extremes whereas the model application in Chapter V 
assumes that there are only two groups patronizing each of 
two departments. With fewer groups to be differentially 
treated, the system will be less complicated and more 
feasible to implement in actual cooperatives. After 
deciding how patrons are to be categorized, the method of 
applying differential treatment must be determined. Several 
alternative systems are possible with the most obvious being 
through prices and patronage refund parameters (i^, s^, and 
r^^). However other instruments such as stock policy 
parameters can be used. 
Although many different combinations of patron 
categories and differential treatment methods are possible, 
not all are feasible options. The feasibility of any 
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program of member differential treatment depends on its 
adherence to the Rochdale Principles, legality, and 
acceptability by members. Through an examination of the 
original intent of each of the Rochdale Principles it was 
concluded that a policy of differential treatment could be 
devised that would be consistent with cooperative 
philosophy. Some principles play more crucial roles than 
others in permitting a differential treatment policy and in 
determining its ultimate success. The keystone to the 
permissibility of cooperative differential treatment is the 
principle of "operation at cost". If each member is 
expected to pay only for the actual costs incurred by the 
cooperative in providing the service, then this in-fers that 
patrons can be treated distinctly. The member education 
principle does not outwardly advocate or dispel the notion 
of this type of policy. However, it could play a very 
significant role. In commencing a program that treats 
patrons differently, it is crucial that each patron knows 
the reasons for differential treatment. A sound education 
program is therefore a decisive element in any policy of 
differential treatment. 
With no outright violation of the cooperative 
principles, two other areas of concern are the legality and 
acceptability by members of the policy. The legality of the 
issue revolves around the legal requirement that for a given 
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product, all members should be treated exactly the same. 
This may come in conflict with the cooperative operating at 
cost. This cost basis justification must be made if the 
cooperative uses differential treatment. This cost 
differential in turn enables the decision-maker to establish 
different prices and different financial policies for the 
different patrons. The key to achieving an operable policy 
is having members accept the program, which in turn relies 
heavily on the educational system of the cooperative. It is 
apparent that the feasibility of differentially treating 
members is closely related to the operating principles of 
cooperatives, legality issues, and the acceptance of the 
policy by the member patrons themselves. 
In building the general model, previous works were 
utilized but additional features were added to allow 
individual members to be treated differently. The work by 
Royer [52] and VanSickle [64] established models that looked 
at the production and financial aspects of cooperative 
operations. Both of these however dealt with only a 
"typical" member patron and did not allow differential 
treatment. As an extension to these works, the general 
model presented in Chapter III allows differential treatment 
of patrons. The Kuhn-Tucker conditions yielded by the model 
are similar to those for previous models but provide more 
detailed information for the cooperative decision-maker. 
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The model provides operating guidelines for the 
decision-maker with respect to pricing, patronage refund 
policies, and stock policies. The development of the model 
involved constructing an individual member objective 
function, a cooperative production-pricing objective 
function, and a cooperative financial objective function. 
The simulated application of the model in Chapter V is based 
on the general model but only considers a limited product 
line and only two patron groups. Similar to Royer's and 
VanSickle's research, the Kuhn-Tucker conditions for the 
general model are very complex and require that extensive 
amounts of information about each patron be available to the 
decision-maker. The computer model utilized three product 
lines with each being purchased or supplied by two distinct 
patron groups. A four stage procedure was used in the 
computer simulation model. The simulation model would yield 
varying results depending on the member and non-member 
supply and demand functions as exogenously specified. The 
steps employed in the application procedure involved (a) 
specifying the member and non-member supply and demand 
functions (distinct for each cooperative), (b) solving a 
pricing-production model to determine the price and quantity 
for each product for each patron group, (c) solving a 
financial model through a two-step procedure to ascertain 
the optimal values of and s^, and (d) updating the 
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exogenous parameters of the pricing-production model with 
the new values for membership, patronage, t^, and s^. 
Conclusions 
The simulation model was set up on a microcomputer with 
the intent that it could be used by cooperative 
decision-makers to make operating decisions. It is 
important to realize that the results of the various 
application runs are dependent on the specified supply and 
demand functions. Specific cooperative decision-makers can 
benefit from this model if they can supply the appropriate 
parameters. Even though the results vary depending on the 
exogenously specified parameters, several general 
conclusions can be derived. The first result involves the 
relative supply (demand) elasticities of the deferment 
period and percent patronage refund paid in cash. Depending 
on these relative elasticities, the cooperative 
decision-maker can increase aggregate member patrons' 
profits by adjusting the levels of t and s_. The second 
conclusion relates to the last stage of the computer model, 
the variable updating process. The decision-maker can use 
and s^ to encourage membership in certain groups which 
may in turn benefit both the patron and the cooperative as a 
whole. The most interesting result revolves around the idea 
that under certain conditions, the cooperative 
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decision-maker can increase the profits of both groups of 
patrons by using differential treatment. The membership 
function in the updating stage is also cooperative specific 
and can heavily influence the results. Even though the 
membership adjustment function in this work was specified in 
a general way, it still provides insight into the effects of 
differential treatment policies on membership. These 
conclusions suggest that the cooperative manager has many 
factors to consider when making their decisions. They must 
be aware of the cost of providing a product and the 
responsiveness of patrons to cooperative decisions or 
policies. 
Suggestions for Future Research 
In running the various cooperative scenarios in the 
simulation model, several areas of further research are 
evident. One obvious area is to look at the effects of 
alternative specifications of the member adjustment 
function. That is, how do various combinations or 
interactions of s^ and price affect membership? The 
model used in this study assumes that membership decisions 
are based on a comparison of the previous year's values of 
these factors to the current values assuming no interaction 
effects. A second suggestion for future work is to apply 
the general simulation model to an actual cooperative. This 
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research applies the theoretical model by simulating various 
scenarios for a hypothetical cooperative. It would be 
interesting to work with a specific cooperative 
decision-maker and try to project (or determine) the results 
from converting (or already having converted) the firm to 
one that differentially treats patrons. Another area of 
further research involves obtaining empirical evidence to 
support the theoretical model. This would involve involve 
identifying the responsiveness of patrons to changes in the 
cooperative operating decisions and the determination of the 
actual cooperative cost functions. 
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APPENDIX A. LIST OF THEORETICAL MODEL SYMBOLS 
A = The set of member patrons 
B = The set of all patrons 
C = The set of outputs sold to and variable inputs 
purchased from the cooperative by the member and 
non-member patrons 
Cy = The amount of indirect costs allocated to the L-th 
department 
'L 
CS = The total value of stock employed by the cooperative 
D = The total amount of debt employed by the cooperative 
D^ = The subset if L is a marketing department and Yj^ 
if L is a supply department 
d = The discount rate of the n-th member 
n 
DS = The total dividends on member stock (the sum over 
all "n" in ds^) 
ds^ = The dividends on stock held by the n-th member patron 
E = The set B if the cooperative meets 521 status 
requirements, otherwise set E is defined as set A 
FCM = The total fixed costs of the member patrons (the sum 
over all "n" in fc^) 
fc = The fixed costs of the n-th member or non-member 
n 
"n = Tn(l-Sn) 
IC = The dividend rates paid on stock 
n ^ 
IM = The maximum allowable dividend rate that can be paid 
on stock 
K = The amount of equity capital employed by the 
cooperative 
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L = The Lagrangian function corresponding to the 
cooperative's production-pricing model 
M = The number of member patrons in the cooperative 
association 
MNSj, = The marginal net savings of the cooperative caused by 
a change in the level of K 
N = The amount of net savings used in the revolving fund 
of the cooperative 
= The number of patrons in the n-th group of producers 
NS = The total net savings of the cooperative 
= The net savings of the L-th marketing department 
NSl2 = The net savings of the L-th supply department 
0(M,K) = The total net operating income of the cooperative 
Py = The vector of prices of outputs in set X produced by 
" all patrons (for the n-th member) 
= The vector of prices of variable inputs in set Y used 
by all patrons (for the n-th member) 
p^ = The price of the i-th good for sets V and Z 
p^^ = The price of the i-th product for the n-th patron 
PKQP = The level of capital supplied by retained patronage 
refunds from previous years 
PR = The amount of qualified patronage refunds allocated 
by the cooperative 
PR = The amount of patronage refunds allocated to the n-th 
cooperative patron 
PS = The price of stock for the n-th member group (the 
subscript 'n' is eliminated if the price is equal for 
all member groups) 
PVPR = The present value of the allocated patronage refunds 
pvpr = The present value of the expected patronage refunds 
allocated to the n-th member patron 
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A vector of quantities of each of the products in 
set C 
A vector of quantities of each variable input in set 
V used by the cooperative and purchased from outside 
the cooperative association 
A vector of quantities of the fixed inputs in Set Wf 
used by the cooperative 
A vector of quantities of the outputs in set X 
produced by the member and non-member patrons and 
used by the cooperative 
A vector of quantities of the variable inputs in set 
Y purchased by the member and non-member patrons 
A vector of quantities of the outputs in set Z 
produced by the cooperative and sold to buyers 
outside the cooperative association 
The quantity of the i-th good for sets V and Z 
The average quantity of the i-th product for a 
member in the n-th group 
The quantity of the i-th product used in the 
production of the j-th product 
: the quantity of the i-th product used in the 
production of the j-th product bought by the n-th 
member group 
The stock of the i-th fixed factor available to the 
n-th patron group 
The quantity of the i-th product purchased or sold by 
the non-member patrons 
A vector of the quantities of each of the fixed 
inputs in set Wf used by the n-th member patron group 
A vector of the quantities of each of the outputs in 
set X produced by the n-th member patron group 
A vector of the quantities of each of the variables 
in set Y used by the n-th member patron group 
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r = The average interest rate of all cooperative debt 
sources 
r. = The per-unit patronage refund on the i-th product for 
the n-th patron group 
= The n-th member patron group s expected per-unit 
patronage refund on the i-th product 
SH = The n-th member group's number of shares of stock 
" held 
SPs^ = The shadow price associated with the percent cash 
patronage refund of the n-th member 
SPic = The shadow price associated with the actual dividend 
rate for stock for the n-th member group 
s = The proportion of allocated patronage refunds paid in 
cash for the n-th member group 
— s —Tp + (1—s )/(l+d ) 
T(M,K) = The total net revenue generated by the cooperative 
from member business in sets X and Y. 
TCC = Total collective costs 
TCP = Total collective profits 
TCR = Total collective revenue 
TKQP = The total value of the capital supplied to the 
cooperative by qualified patronage refunds 
TMP = Total member profits 
TPC = Total private costs 
TPP = Total private profits 
TPR = Total private revenue 
Tp^ = The marginal tax rate for the n-th patron 
t = The cooperative's marginal tax rate 
UR = The unallocated reserves of the coooerative 
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The set of variable inputs used by the cooperative 
and purchased from outside the cooperative 
association 
The set of fixed inputs available to the cooperative 
The set of outputs produced by the member and 
non-member patrons 
The subset of goods in set X that represents business 
through the cooperative 
The subset of products in set X handled by the L-th 
department 
The subset of goods in set X that represents business 
through non-cooperative firms 
The set of variable inputs purchased by the member 
and non-member patrons 
The subset of products in set Y that represents 
business through the cooperative 
The subset of products in set Y handled by the L-th 
department 
The subset of products in set Y that represents 
business through non-cooperative firms 
The set of outputs produced by the cooperative and 
sold to buyers outside the cooperative association 
The set of outputs produced by the L-th department of 
the cooperative and sold to buyers outside the 
cooperative association 
The proportion of the cooperative's operating income 
that is allocated to the n-th patron group 
The Lagrangian function corresponding to the 
cooperative's financial model 
The Lagrangian multiplier corresponding to the 
financial status of cooperative 
d = The Lagrangian multipliers corresponding to 
the specified minimum and maximum values of the 
amount of patronage refund paid in cash 
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The Lagrangian multipliers corresponding to the 
maximum dividend rates on member held stock 
The Lagrangian function corresponding to the problem 
of a member patron 
The Lagrangian multipler corresponding to the 
production function 
The Lagrangian multiplier corresponding to the 
production-pricing model for full usage of capital 
The Lagrangian multiplier corresponding to the 
production-pricing model for full usage of fixed 
factors. 
The Lagrangian multiplier corresponding to the 
distribution of net savings within the cooperartive 
The total profits of the member patrons 
The profit of the n-th member patron 
= The length of the cooperative's revolving fund for 
the n-th member group 
The implicit form of the production function of the 
cooperative 
The implicit form of the production function of the 
n-th member or non-member patron group 
The Lagrangian multiplier corresponding to the 
individual member's production function 
The Lagrangian multiplier corresponding to the 
individual member's i-th fixed factor constraint 
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APPENDIX B. DEPARTMENTAL NET SAVINGS 
eY jeZj^ n£B lev icWf 
NSL I  = the net savings of the L-th marketing 
department 
= the subset of products in set Z, produced in 
the L-th department 
Xj^ = the subset of products in set X handled by 
the L-th department 
= the number of patrons in the n-th group 
p. = the price of the i-th product (for goods in 
^ sets V or Z) 
p. = the price of the i-th product for the n-th 
patron 
q. = the quantity of the i-th product (for goods 
^ in sets V or Z) 
q. = the average quantity of the i-th product for 
a member in the n-th group 
q. . = the quantity of the i-th product used in the 
production of the i-th product bought by the 
n-th member group 
= the amount of indirect cost allocated to the 
L-th department 
p., iCWf = the price charged each department for the 
use of the i-th fixed factor 
B = the set of all patrons, (members and 
non-members) 
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The net savings of the L-th marketing department of the 
cooperative can be explained as: The sales of products sold 
to markets outside the cooperative by department L; less a 
charge for all products marketed through the L-th department 
of the cooperative which were not used in production of 
variable inputs purchased from all patrons; less a charges 
for variable inputs purchased by patrons which were used in 
the production of goods sold to markets outside the 
cooperative by the L-th department; less a charge for 
variable inputs used by the cooperative and purchased from 
outside the cooperative by the L-th department for the 
production of goods sold to markets outside the cooperative; 
less a charge for all fixed factors used by the L-th 
department for production of goods sold to markets outside 
the cooperative; and less an amount of indirect cost 
allocated to the L-th marketing department. 
NSyg = Z p.q.-Z Z ZNp.q..-Z Z Zp.q. 
" jsZ, : : i£X JeY, neB isY jeY, neB 
L L 
- z Z  Z N p . q . . - Z  Z  Z N p . q . . - C ,  
ieV jcY^ neB " ieWf jcY^ neB " ^ 
where NS^2 = the net savings of the L-th supply department 
Y. = the subset of products in set Y, produced in 
the L-th department 
The net savings of the L-th supply department of the 
cooperative can be described as: The value of variable 
inputs purchased by patrons that are sold by the L-th 
department; less the value of the set of outputs produced by 
patrons which are used in the production of the set of 
variable inputs purchased by patrons, sold by the L-th 
department; less the value of the set of variable inputs 
purchased by patrons that are not produced in the L-th 
department which are used in the production of the variable 
inputs purchased by patrons, sold by the L-th department; 
less the value of the set of variable inputs used by the 
cooperative which are purchased from outside the cooperative 
and are used in the production of variable inputs purchased 
by patrons sold by the L-th department; less the value of 
the set of fixed inputs available to the cooperative used in 
the production of the variable inputs purchased by patrons 
sold by the L-th department; and less an amount of indirect 
cost allocated to the L-th supply department. 
